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ABSTRACT
Private disinvestment from rental properties in New York City
has been a problem now for at least two decades. This process
results in the abandonment of buildings, many of which are also
vacated by tenants. In the past twenty years, New York City has
lost approximately one million housing units.
There are different theories about why landlord abandonment
occurs. The neoclassical theory focuses on rent regulations and
zoning laws as disincentives for reinvestment. Existing
structures are allowed to deteriorate as regulated rents fail to
cover maintenance and improvement costs. This theory assumes that
the private market would be the most effective mechanism for
providing housing if only the government would leave it alone.
Challenging this theory is the contention that a growing
number of New Yorkers do not earn enough money to pay for the
upkeep of their rental units. Figures on average rent-to-income
ratios bear out this contention. If peoples' incomes are not
sufficient to support a private housing market, then government
must step in to insure that people are adequately housed. This
can be done by subsidizing the private sector to continue
providing housing to the poor, or by circumventing the private
market altogether.
The economic problems that have led to this affordability
gap are generally beyond the control of any municipal government.
Yet certainly city governments suffer the consequences. City
services are taxed by the symptoms of neighborhood deterioration;
the city tax base is erroded as property becomes less valuable.
In the most extreme cases, property loses its value completely;
the city government becomes its actual owner through foreclosure
for non-payment of real estate taxes. In some New York City
neighborhoods the municipal government owns a sizeable percentage
of the residential property.
New York City appears to be unique in the extent of its tax-
foreclosed inventory and its methods of managing it. While vacant
buildings are sold at auction, occupied buildings are not. Most
occupied properties are managed by the city's housing agency.
Others enter one of several alternative management programs; the
goal of most of these is to sell the building to the tenants as a
limited equity cooperative.
While certainly none of these programs has been problem-
free, all have been effective in providing shelter to the poorest
segment of the population living in the most delapidated housing.
Doubts about the long term success of current alternative
management programs center around the lack of resources devoted to
them. In spite of the fact that most buildings enter city
ownership with every major system deteriorated, city programs
devote only a few thousand dollars toward the rehabilitation of
each unit. The future of these housing programs seem imperiled by
the frayed shoestring on which they must operate.
Proper funding for city-owned propertry would not require
substantial new resources. In fact, with a change in program
design., only $20 million more would be needed to ensure the
structural viability of each unit. This is money that would be
well spent, since the city's failure to invest in its properties
today will only lead to greater expenses tomorrow.
While officials should explore ways of attracting more
federal money and tapping private sources, in fact adequate
funding should be available in the city budget. An equitable tax
system, in which there would not be abatements for developers
operating in lucrative areas, would generate sufficient revenue to
pay for the renovation of city-owned residential buildings.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Phillip L. Clay
Associate Professor of Urban Studies and PlanningTitle:
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Abstract
Table of Contents
INTRODUCTION...............................................
A. Traditional Responses to Gaps in the Supply of and the
Demand for Housing: The Case of New York City.........
B. Housing Costs and Renter Incomes in New York City......
1. The Rent Gap Today: A Snapshot...................
2. The Rent Gap: Trends.............................
C. The Southside..........................................
D. What is the In Rem Housing Program?....................
PART I
1. Landlord Abandonment...................................
A. The Dymanics of a Declining Neighborhood...............
B. Portraits of Slum Landlords............................
2.
A.
B.
C.
D.
Tax Delinquency and Foreclosure....
Overview...........................
Tax Delinquency in New York City...
City Ownership and Tax Delinquency
Conclusions........................
in the Southsi
PART II
3. Antecedents to the In Rem Housing Program.
A. Homeownership for the Poor.................
B. Self-Help Housing and Sweat Equity........
C. Early New York City Cooperatives..........
D. Early City-Sponsored Cooperatives.........
4. Creation of Current In Rem Programs.......
A. The Office of Property Management.........
..1 a
.. a
.. a
de.
.. a
. . ...... 1
.2
.4
.5
.7
10
12
17
17
21
27
27
29
35
42
B. The Division of Property Management: Public Landlord......60
5. Creation of the Division of Alternative
Application of Self-Help Housing Models
Owned Property..........................
A. The Community Management Program........
B. Tenant Interim Leasing..................
C. Why Self-Help?..........................
1. Critiques of Self-Help: I..........
2. Critiques of Self-Help: II.........
6.
A.
B.
C.
DAMP's Effectiveness in Creating
Lack of Alternatives............
Sales Policy....................
Financial Viability.............
195 South Fourth Street.......
167 Havemeyer Street..........
Tenant
......
.. .. Aaa a
Management Progr
to Management of
................ a a
................ a
................ a a a
. .a............. U
Cooperati
.........
.........
......... a a
......... a a
......... a s
ves.
.45
.46
.48
.50
.53
.57
.57
ams:
City-
... 68
.. 69
... 72
.. 74
.. 75
... 83
... 92
... 93
... 95
.. 98
.. 102
.. 106
A Proposed Alternative Management
Model..........
Program Design..
Sales Policy....
Program Rational
e......................
...................... a
e. . . . . . . . . . .
112
112
116
117
PART III
Funding the In Rem Housing Program.........
How Much for In Rem Housing?...............
Additional Government Funding Sources......
Alternative Funding Sources: Housing Trust
The Cross-Subsidy Program..................
An Equitable Tax System....................
119
121
124
125
132
133
Funds.
. . . .n
CONCLUSION....................................................136
A. The Future of In Rem Housing..............................138
APPENDICES
1. Summary of Changes in New York City Rent Regulati
1943 through the present.........................
2. The Redemption Process............................
3. The Legal Status of DAMP cooperatives.............
4. Assumptions used for Calculating Projected Costs
Buildings........................................
on Systems,
a. ...... . 142
a. ...... . 143
........ 146
for In Rem
........ 148
5. Sources for Proposed Housing Trust Fund...................149
BIBLIOGRAPHY...................................................152
A.
B.
C.
8.
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
7. Assisted Tenant Leasing:
GIntroduction
INTRODUCTION
... for most of the last three decades housing groblems have
generally been confined to low-income and minority people.
Others have had housing inconveniences.
1
-- Cushing Dolbeare
This study was motivated by the urgent need to provide
adequate housing for the poor. Although there has been a public
commitment to provide basic needs such as food and health care to
all, publicly supported housing is available only to a few. There
is consensus that people should not be driven to live in the
streets, but there is no consensus on how to provide sufficient
housing to avoid this consequence.
Difficulty in defining national policies for housing is due
in part to its schizophrenic nature. Housing is both necessity
and luxury, consumer good and investment. The production and
distribution of housing involve the many levels of the
construction and finance industries, each of which makes money at
some point in the process. Consumers of housing are supporting
all these participants. Finding a way to provide housing to those
whose incomes aren't sufficient to motivate this establishment is
therefore complex. The constant shifts in government policies
over the past four decades reflect disagreement about who most
needs to be subsidized--the developers, the consumers, or the
owners. No group has been able to find an efficient and equitable
way to create low-income housing.
1
Rarely has a public program worked outside of the private
real estate industry, endeavoring to limit costs by eliminating
profits. This is precisely the approach of New York City's In Rem
Housing Program. This program represents New York's attempt to
handle the thousands of occupied housing units that have come into
its ownership by virtue of the former owner's failure to pay
property taxes. It is thus a program by default, not by design.
Gradually, city officials have begun to see the necessity of
treating (or the impossibility of ignoring) their occupied housing
stock. They have developed a series of programs that, taken
together, offer a unique and comprehensive means of preserving
low-income housing. In rem housing programs, most of which
replace traditional private management with public or tenant
control, have taken root only because of the private sector's lack
of interest in providing low-income housing without deep
subsidies. But they offer alternatives to the for-profit housing
system that could extend beyond the landlord-abandoned stock.
A~. Traditional Res29ones2 to Ga2 sin the SU221Y of and the Demand
for Housing: The Case of New York C ity
More than any other city, New York is a renter's town. Less
than 30"/ of the population owns its housing, and of that
2
percentage 7.3% live in cooperative apartments . With the
predominance of multi-family apartment buildings, most renters
(75%) live in investor-owned rather than owner occupied
3
buildings .When tax burdens become too high in other cities,
property owners lobby for changes in tax assessments. But in New
York the voices of small property owners are drowned out by those
of tenants demanding rent regulations and developers lobbying for
tax abatements. This may explain why New York has been able to
take such bold steps in seizing tax-delinquent buildings: the
landlord and homeowner lobby has relatively little influence in
policy-making. The city is further unique in the fact that most
landord-abandoned property is of the multi-family tenement stock.
Furthermore, New York has lost an astounding 360,000 housing
4
units since 1970, the equivalent of four Bostons . Paradoxically
this loss has persisted inspite of low vacancy rates:
Table A Net Vacancy Rates By Mognthly Contact
ityn 12h4
Monthly
Contract Rent
Total
Less than $100
$100-$124
$125-$149
$150-$174
$175-$199
$200-$249
$250-$299
$300-$399
$400-$499
$500 or more
RentL NRw York
Rental
Vacancy RatS
2.04%
.52
1.44
.26
.69
.37
1.50
2.18
1.45
1.77
2.99
Source: Stegman, from 1984
Housing and Vacancy Survey
This apparent contradiction exists because most New Yorkers can't
pay enough rent to make proper building maintenance worthwhile.
Units that are abandoned, whether they are left standing or
New York City
demolished, are no longer considered part of the housing stock and
therefore are not included in the calculation of the vacancy rate.
The bulk of housing loss occured during the 1970s, a time of
economic distress for the entire city. Operating costs rose
faster than renters' incomes, and total population fell. Some of
these trends have begun to reverse in the 1980s, and the rate of
housing abandonment has slowed. For the first time since before
1970 there was a net gain of nearly 85,000 housing units, although
a continued drop in the number of rental housing units. Between
5
1981 and 1984 population rose by 1.1'4 . The very low vacancy
rates reflect the impact of population growth on a housing market
not yet recovered from the disasterous 1970s.
B. Housing Cgts and Renter Incomes in New York City
The difficulty of providing housing for low-income families
has increased over the past few years, as operating costs have
risen must faster than incomes. This affordability crisis, which
reflects a continuing trend, is so severe that it has replaced
housing quality as the nation's most critical barrier to
sheltering it population. In New York City the discrepancy
between what people can pay and what the market demands is large
indeed.
4
1. The Rent Gap Tgdgyi A Snagshgt
Today, the median apartment in New York City rents for $330
a month. Median income for all New York renters is close to
6
$13,000 a year . A tenant earning the median and paying a quarter
of his or her gross income for rent could afford $270.00 a month,
$60 below the median. This gap would be closed if the rent-income
ratio were increased to one-third, in which case the median tenant
could pay $360.00 a month. While this might be a feasible ratio
for a single person, however, a family with children is hard-
7
pressed to pay one-third of a small income for shelter
A comparison of median rents and median incomes is not an
adequate measure of housing affordability in New York for several
reasons. First, $330.00 a month is the median rent of all
1,901,000 rental units in the city. This includes the 168,000
units run by the New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA), in which
rents are held to 27% of a tenant's income and subsidized by the
federal government. With a waiting list of over ten years, NYCHA
apartments are not actually available on the market. Similarly,
218,000 apartments are rent-controlled (see Appendix 1) their
median rent of $259 a month brings down the city-wide median.
Under the current city regulations apartments become decontrolled
upon vacancy. Therefore these apartments cannot be considered to
be available on the market at those rents. In total, 386,000
apartments, or 17.5% of the rental stock, are either not available
or not available at current low rents in any meaningful sense. A
snapshot of the rental situation is somewhat misleading; current
tenants in place enjoy a reasonable median rent, but those seeking
apartments are faced with another supply curve altogether.
In a city encompassing such extremes of wealth and poverty
as New York does, any aggregate measure such as a median is
suspect. A breakdown of the statistics will reveal for instance,
that while annual income for all renters is just under $13,000,
for black renters it is $11,000 a year and for Hispanics only
$8,000. The average black family can comfortably pay a $229.00
monthly rent but the actual median is $298.00; the Hispanic
family, which can afford $166.00, is confronted with a $275.00
median. Clearly, minority families are far more constrained in
the housing market. That finding an affordable apartment is a
problem for many families is indicated by the 32.9% of all
8
households paying over 40% of their income for rent
Another inadequacy of the median rent as a measure of
affordability is that, in severely deteriorated neighborhoods,
rents may not reflect the actual cost of running a building.
Landlords serving low-income tenants are frequently delinquent in
their property tax payments (see Chapter Two) or in their building
maintenance practices. Their tenants pay low rents but receive
substandard housing in return. What it costs to run a building
well may be higher than the median rent in poor neighborhoods.
6
2. The Rent Gap: Trends
These figures suggest that, even in the absence of all other
deterrents, low incomes are enough to prevent the poor from
occupying decent private housing. A look at the trends affecting
rent levels and incomes shows that the rent gap will most likely
increase, especially for the poor. During the 1970s, when owner
abandonment peaked, operating expenses rose faster than both
median rents and median incomes. Two of the largest costs for
property owners--fuel and capital--were climbing rapidly. The oil
shocks of 1973 and 1979 drove the price of oil from a reported
9
twelve cents a gallon in 1970 to $1.05 a gallon in 1980. At the
same time, the prime rate jumped from 5% to 18%. Properites that
were marginal in 1970 would be losing money ten years later.
While inflation is less of a problem today and operating
expenses are levelling off, median rents are still increasing
faster than incomes. From 1981 to 1984, real income (in 1967
dollars) of renters actually fell 4.4% while real rents increased
10
5.8% . This disparity is due at least in part to the large
number of coop conversions: because many upper income renters
became coop or condominium owners,. their incomes are no longer
calculated as part of the renter total. But there are factors
other than a shift in tenure preference at work. Landlords feel
they are entitled to recover the profits they claim to have lost
in the 1970s, and the Rent Guidelines Board, which determines
legal rent levels in New York City, has granted increases above
changes in operating costs in recognition of their claims.
7
Thus New York City is experiencing two related housing
crises: supply and affordability. Logic would dictate that both
problems be addressed by increased housing production.
Subscribers to the popular theory of filtration embrace this
notion when they reason that new housing, however expensive,
opens up units all the way down the line, as housing vacated by
one income group is filled by the group just below. It would
follow that the public interest would best be served by a
government policy that promoted development by removing
disincentives (e.g., zoning restrictions and rent regulations)
and offering incentives (e.g., tax abatements).
But just as tax cuts for the rich have never managed to
"trickle down" into the bank accounts of the poor, so the
filtering process doesn't appear to provide adequate low-cost
housing. Weinstein proposes several reasons for its failure:
... the housing market has barriers to open
competition and the easy movement of dwellings from one group
of users to another, such as fixity of location, zoning, deed
restriction, discrimination and simply because of the lack of
a surplusli.
Critics of the filtration theory have pointed to the plight of
residents of the Bronx, where the construction of the 60,000-unit,
middle-income Coop City project was expected to open up thousands
of sound apartments. Apartments vacated by the primarily wbite
middle-class Coop City residents were occupied by black tenants,
but they soon deteriorated into slums and many are now
8
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abandoned . Whatever the dynamics that lead to neighborhood
deterioration and building abandonment (they will be explained in
the next chapter), this example suggests that the construction of
new, high-rent units provides an insufficient guarantee of
improved housing conditions for the poor.
It is also unlikely that rent subsidies alone can compensate
for the paucity of adequate, affordable housing. They are meant
to enable renters to seek apartments at higher rents,
theoretically opening up new opportunities for low-income
families, but the extremely low vacancy rates in-New York for all
except luxury housing (see Table A) bring this line of reasoning
into question. Rental subsidies would have to bring families
above the $500-a-month level to give them a significantly better
chance of finding an apartment. Even then the issuance of
subsidies to all eligible renters without any increase in housing
supply would merely raise the base rent for slum housing without
necessarily improving conditions.
The inadequacy of such provisions for low-income families
led to the inception of other federal programs. HUD's Section 8,
for instance, tried to address both supply and affordability by
offering construction financing and generous rent subsidies to
developers. But the projects sponsored by Section 8, such as a
231-unit Harlem apartment complex with estimated construction
costs of $80,000 a unit and requiring another $12,440 a year to
13
subsidize rentals , only seemed to waste tax dollars. Such
exorbitant building and operating costs render the systematic
9
construction 'of new units for the poor both impractical and
politically unpopular.
Of course, such deep subsidies benefit the developers more
than the tenants. Poor families can be housed just as comfortably
at less expense in moderately renovated units. In this assumption
lies the premise of the In Rem Housing Program, which saves
deteriorated housing units before they succumb to the last stages
of abandonment. It achieves moderate rehabilitation at minimal
cost by relying for renovation not on for-profit developers, but
on the tenants themselves.
What do these trends suggest for the future of low-income
housing? It's too expensive to construct new units for the poor,
and new construction for the affluent is no guarantee that
affordable units will open up, especially since New York's
population is now growing. While newly constructed units are
necessary to accomodate the demand for market-rate housing, city
policy must simultaneously reduce the loss of units through
abandonment. The In Rem Housing Program addresses this latter
issue.
C. The Southside
Because aggregate data can obscure so many disparate and
interesting factors, I felt it was important to study housing
trends in one neighborhood. I wanted to examine a neighborhood
that is experiencing private disinvestment, but is not a
10
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I chose the Southside, one of several neighborhoods
comprising the Williamsburg-Greenpoint section of Northern
Brooklyn, for a number of reasons:
1. Although it is lotated in Brooklyn and shares many of the
woes of other neighborhoods in the "outer boroughs.," the
Southside is only ten minutes from downtown Manhattan. It
has much in common with Manhattan neighborhoods such as
Harlem and the Lower East Side, where the trend toward the
depreciation of property values is beginning to be reversed.
There are the first signs of land speculation but few yet of
gentrification or upgrading.
2. 40% of the Southside's housing stock--turn-of-the
century tenements--resembles that of Manhattan neighborhoods,
but the many one- to-four- unit brownstones are similar to
those in other Brooklyn neighborhoods. The population
therefore contains both tenants and homeowners.
3. There is a high incidence of city ownership in this area
and many city-owned buildings are in alternative management
programs. Because of the long history of tenant management
in the Southside I was able to interview tenants in long-
established cooperatives as well as those living in buildings
still undergoing conversion.
4. The Southsi.de is one of the poorest neighborhoods (see
Table B) in the city. The In Rem Housing Program's
effectiveness in this area would therefore indicate whether
the program can indeed create housing opporunities for the
least affluent.
ii
wasteland.
Table B The Southside: A Profile
Number of persons 22,872
Number of households 7,493
Persons per household 3.05
Persons of Spanish origin 20,146
Population of Spanish origin 88%
Labor Force participation 52%
(labor force/population.aged 16-65)
Unemployment 11.7%
Median income $6,319
Receiving Public Assistance 30.0%
Source: 1980 Census
D. What Is the In Rem Housing Program?
Officially, the In Rem Housing Program (described at length
in Chapters Three and Four) is the means by which New York City
handles its abundant stock of occupied, landlord-abandoned, tax-
foreclosed housing. But since tenants living in the tax-
foreclosed stock are among the poorest in the city--their median
annual income is $4,000 less than the median for all renters--the
IRHP is, in effect, a housing program for the poor. The 46,000
occupied in rem units represent only 2.4% of the city's occupied
14
rental stock but they are clustered in deteriorated
neighborhoods: these areas, where there is little private market
activity, the handling of city-owned property becomes the
neighborhood housing policy. On the other hand, city-owned
12
buildings represent the last islands of affordable housing in
gentrified neighborhoods; their disposition decides the future of
the poor in those areas.
While many occupied, city-owned buildings are managed by the
city housing agency, the Department of Housing Preservation and
Development, one-third of the units are managed by other sponsors.
Many of these are tenant and community groups which are able to
purchase the buildings, after some renovation, as cooperatives.
The IRHP has tremendous impact in neighborhoods where tenant
management is taking hold, for unlike traditional production
programs, it builds on community strengths and ultimately develops
local institutions in the process of developing housing. In
studying the In Rem Housing Program we have the opportunity to
evaluate the applicability of such alternative forms of management
to a large housing program. Many cities have experimented with
small-scale tenant management and/or sweat equity projects, but
none but the IRHP has proposed this kind of treatment for
thousands of units.
In this thesis I describe the IRHP, and propose a similar
alternative program that confronts.some important issues, such as
insuring the long-term viability of tenant-managed buildings, and
determining an appropriate role for community organizations, which
the current program handles poorly. I make this proposal bearing
in mind that there are a few things that the IRHP is not.
1. It is not a solution to all city-wide housing problems.
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It is not even a complete solution to low-income housing
problems. It builds no new units, and is limited to those
buildings that are abandoned by their owners.
2. It is not a proposal for renovating vacant apartments.
Unfortunately there is no low-cost way to renovate vacant
buildings. Even sweat equity, which was once envisioned as
a means of creating housing for low-income families, can no
longer produce inexpensive units.
3. While it presents a model of for the management of
property in the absence of private investment, it does not
provide a means or a rationale for taking low-income housing
out of private hands when there is market interest. Thus it
cannot support the efforts of low-income housing advocates in
gentrifying neighborhoods.
4. This is not an alternative to publicly subsidized housing.
The subsidies needed for this program are much lower
than those for rehabilitation programs that depend on
private developers and those for public housing, but they
are necessary.
This thesis addresses the question, "How can a municipal
government house its poor in the absence of private interest and
sufficient federal funds?" New York City's response to that query
is its In Rem Housing Program% In this pAIper I will contrast the
current in rem housing alternatives and further question whether
for-profit, public agency, or tenant control best addresses the
need to maintain landlord-abandoned properties as low-income
housing resources. The introduction has presented backround data
on New York City, described the Southside, and outlined some of
the points of the In Rem Housing Program. Part I will examine
theories of landlord abandonment and neighborhood decline, and
connect these processes with the phenonmenon of tax delinquency.
Part II will contain a description of the components of the In Rem
14
Housing Program, and questions concerning its basic premise--that
tenant management can save landlord-abandoned housing. The
strengths and shortcomings of the IRHP will also be examined, with
suggestions for improvement. In Part III I will discuss the
financial resources needed for a viable program, and identify some
potential funding sources.
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GPart I
CHAPTER ONE: LANDLORD ABANDONMENT
A study of city-owned housing must begin with a discussion
of landlord abandonment. After all, if the City of New York now
owns nearly 10,000 residential buildings it is because their
landlords at some point decided that keeping them was no longer
worth the trouble. While the term abandonment evokes images of
empty hulks of buildings, in fact not all buildings that are left
by their owners end up vacant. - This chapter explains why private
investors have walked from many New York neighborhoods. The
remainder of this thesis is about what happens to the people left
behind.
A. Ih DyggMics of a Declining Ngighbghgood
There is no simple explanation of landlord abandonment. One
might think--and many housing analysts continue to maintain--that
unwise government policies, such as excessive property tax burdens
and stringent rent controls, might have discouraged owners from
maintaining their properties and ultimately led them to walk away.
Profiles of slum landlords dating back through the 1970, however,
all failed to find any evidence that either taxes or rent
1
regulations contributed to disinvestment . Other national
studies have shown no correlation between abandonment and the
2
existence of rent control . More likely, tenants in slum
neighborhoods are paying all they can for their apartments, and
landlords are charging what the market will bear. Higher legal
rents would not produce higher market rents, and therefore would
17
have no impact on a landlord's ability to maintain his property.
The phenomenon of abandonment bears a striking correlation
to the demographic changes associated with "white flight" -- the
exodus of white, largely middle-class residents out of the city.
It is sad to think that white families would rather abandon their
neighborhoods than live with Blacks and Hispanics, but one need
only talk to white families in such white strongholds as the
Northwest Bronx and the southeastern part of Brooklyn to sense the
fear with which they view the entry of people of color into their
neighborhoods. The rapid exodus of an entire population makes a
building--and a neighborhood--vulnerable to abandonment. The
racial dynamic also comes into play in the hostile relationship
between the slumlord and the tenant. The ugly last phases of the
milking process, described later in more detail, are in part
possible because of a white landlord's disrespect for his or her
Black and Hispanic tenantry. Since they somehow "don't count,"
they can live without heat in the winter and have drug dealers as
neighbors without causing their landlord much guilt. This dynamic
3
is apparent in the previously cited studies and conversations
with Southside landlords.
The connection between disinvestment and ethnic change is
impossible to ignore but difficult to explain. Stegman posits
that the lower incomes, larger families and different attitudes of
non-white in-movers have an impact on the quality of housing and
the cost of maintaining it. He further suggests that a family's
attitude toward its apartment may be more important than its
is
income in estimating the potential for deterioration: "If a
landlord gets or creates a tenant who does not seem to care, his
net earnings are partially cut. . . and there is some incentive to
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allow the property to deteriorate" . More precisely., a careless
tenant can double the cost of maintaining his or her unit. When
the landlord and tenant are of different races, unquantifiable
problems arise. The landlord may be willing to take advantage of
the tenants, for instance; he may even be afraid to visit his
properties, thus decreasing personal contact and increasing the
potential for antagonism.
Because investment decisions in both the private and public
sector hinge so much on the investors' confidence in an area's
stability, the rapid turnover in a neighborhood beginning the
process of abandonment discourages public agencies from devoting
resources to that area. At the first signs of transition, banks,
too, will declare a neighborhpod off-limits. Thus disinvestment
becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. Even landlords who want to
maintain their buildings can no longer get financing, and so are
sometimes forced to sell to a slumlord who will milk the building
and abandon it. The timidity of lenders can have a subtler impact
of the low-income housing market. Because of the high risks
associated with inner city investments, banks may look for shorter
pay-back periods, increasing the monthly debt service burden on
the property owner. This added pressure compels the landlord to
look for ways of increasing his or her income to maintain his or
her bank payments. Bank red-lining cannot be blamed entirely for
disinvestment, however; one study found that over three-quarters
of the landlords in some inner-city neighborhoods would not make
5.
improvements even if long-term financing were available
The loss of private capital is evident not only in the
inability of property owners to get financing, but also in the
withdrawal of neighborhood amenities. It is the removal of a
landmark, the deterioration of a recreational site that signals
decline to an area's residents. Every I@W=i@ME@f R@!@h9BFhSS9
seems to have a movie theater that is either abandoned or
converted into a Pentacostal church. Many Brooklynites swear that
Brooklyn began to go downhill when the Dodgers left in 1957, and
see the public housing project constructed on the site of Ebbets
Field as a symbol of the borough's decline.
Withdrawal of public services also contributes to the
abandonment process. This has been a controversial issue in New
York City ever since the fiscal crisis of 1975 caused city
administrators to adopt a de facto "triage" policy, allowing the
poorest neighborhoods to become even more underserved. In the
Women's City Club study of a Bronx neighborhood, landlords cited
poor services such as sanitation as a factor leading to
abandonment. Public service reduction and housing deterioration
can be very closely linked; for instance, withdrawal of fire
fighters from an arson-prone neighborhood can result in the loss
of housing units. The residents of the Northside of Williamsburg
demonstrated this connection seven years ago. In this
neighborhood, dominated by wood frame houses, arson was becoming a
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disturbingly common means of landlord abandonment. Yet the city
closed the only local firehouse. The residents, seeing that their
neighborhood was doomed without firefighting services, began a
protest that included a year-long occupation of the firehouse and
culminated in a demonstration blocking rush-hour traffic on the
Brooklyn-Queens Expressway. The firehouse was reopened, and the
neighborhood survived. More commonly, however, the decline of
services that leads to abandonment is more gradual and therefore
neighborhood residents are less capable of perceiving and halting
it.
B.Portraits of Slum Landlords
Responding to the stereotypes of the 1950s and 1960s that
led to slum clearance policies, Sternlieb and Stegman, in their
1969 -and 1970 studies, were determined to debunk the myth of the
slumlord as a big-time operator reaping unconscionable profits.
Their profiles of inner-city property owners in several cities
showed that, while professional landlords made up a sizable
minority of property owners, the rest were a diverse group. In
Pittsburgh, one-third of inner city property owners were over
6
sixty years old, and one-half earned under $10,000 a year . In
Newark, 45% of all landlords were craftspeople, workers or small
businesspeople,- and only 21% professionals in the real estate
7
field . In New York City, where the predominance of multi-family
tenements would seem to lend itself to professional ownership,
only 31% of the owners were professionals. 34% were craftspeople
or small businesspeople; 15% were retired or unemployed, and the
21
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balance was split among between miscellaneous professions
Of course, this breakdown must be viewed with some skepti-
cism. First, percentages refer to the population of owners, not
the number of housing units. Professional real estate people may
represent one-third of all owners, but control two-thirds of all
units. In Baltimore, for instance, fifty landlords--a small
percentage of total property owners--were found to control one-
9
quarter of the inner-city rental inventory . Second., property
owners can register their buildings in the name of a corporation
or another individual. In the Southside buildings were sometimes
"owned" by mothers, sons or associates of large landlords.
Stegman and Sternlieb describe landlords operating barely
profitable rental property, many of whom seemed overwhelmed by
the transformation of the neighborhoods in which they had
invested. Rolf Goetze created a typology of property owners to
explain the housing market in a similarly transitional Boston
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neighborhood . His Type A, Established Owners and Managers, and
Type B, Blue-Collar Investors, describe most of Stegman's
landlords. Both types operate in stable markets, count on steady
returns and security, and make their money by providing decent
housing.
But the economic trends of the 1970's made it increasingly
difficult for such owners to make a profit. As the data in the
introduction made clear, escalating operating costs have outpaced
income gains for most renters. Between 1970 and 1976, rents in
11
New York City rose 179% faster than renters' incomes . Given
these figures, Type A and B landlords who had been barely earning
a profit in 1970 were, by 1978 or 1980, faced with two
unattractive options. They could walk away from their buildings,
or they could sell to the Operatorsq Goetze's Type D landlords.
Whichever of these options the original landlords chose, they
contribute to the decline of the building and the neighborhood,
for the Operator makes a living off of unprofitable buildings by
running them down without concern for housing quality in a process
known as "milking."
One of the more intriguing aspects of New York's marginal
real estate market is the persistence of these Operators. In the
Southside, title searches and interviews with tenants in a dozen
buildings reveal a pattern: Most of these New Law tenements,
which had been owned by an individual or family for decades, were
at some point sold to a corporate entity that represented one of a
small group of local landlords. In some cases the sale followed
the death of the original owner, but often it seemed to come at a
point after which he could no longer make a legitimate profit.
The sales seemed to cluster around 1973-4 and 1979-80, times of
rapid oil price increases. Robert Schur suggests that many
original landlords who sold to Operators were "not sufficiently
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cognizant of ["milking"'s] nuances " . Tenant reports of
decreased services, illegal rent increases, and an influx of
undesirable tenants coincided with the change in ownership.
Activists from other low-income neighborhoods report a pattern
identical to that in the Southside.
There is money to be made in these buildings, but
unfortunately for those who live in them, the profit comes not
from running them well but from running them poorly. An owner
"milks" a profit from a building which has already started to
deteriorate by avoiding as many expenses as possible: Debt
service is either minimal, because the building was purchased for
very little, or postponable, because the landlord knows that the
mortgage holder will be reluctant to foreclose. Payment of
property taxes can be avoided for years (although legally the city
can foreclose on a property after one year of indebtedness, in
fact foreclosures take place every three years or so--see Chapter
Two) and even when the city threatens foreclosure it is possible
to sign an installment agreement that delays the action even
longer. Maintenance and services provide limited heat and hot
water, and only infrequent, slipshod repairs. Meanwhile the
landlord continues to collect rent. Peter Salins describes the
end result of this process:
A combination of aggressive rent collection efforts, minimal
maintenancetax delinquency, low purchase down payments, and
delinquency in paying off purchase money mortgages can permit
an owner to make a handsome profit for a limited time, even
as he writes off a larger portion of the rent roll and
depreciates the asset value of the property to zero by
walking away from his building when its economic potential is
exhausted (13).
The extent of disinvestment and the preponderance of
Operators in poor neighborhoods circumscribe the policy
alternatives available to city officials. For instance, a
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slumlord whose profit comes from milking will not necessarily
provide adequate services if government subsidies allow his or her
tenants to pay higher rents. Even a more reputable property.owner
might not feel that rent subsidies assured a sufficient income to
merit new investment. Interest subsidies on improvement loans,
such as those currently offered to landlords by the city
government, might encourage landlords to renovate but not
necessarily to maintain rents affordable to the former low-income
tenantry. A program to deal with a deteriorated neighborhood
would have to couple subsidized loan money with subsidized rents.
And this expensive proposition still does not address some of the
less tangible but, as Stegman's study demonstrated, significant
landlord-tenant tensions that contribute to neighborhood decline.
Another alternative, which has become the unarticulated policy in
New York City, is not to try to stop landlords from walking away
from their unprofitable properties. In the landlord's absence,
management of these buildings is handed over to a not-for-profit
manager. The legal mechanism for doing this is the tax
foreclosure statute that allow the city to seize tax delinquent
properties and then either run them itself or negotiate their sale
to low-income housing providers. This is the basis of the In Rem
Housing Program.
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CHAPTER TWO:
TAX-DELINQUENCY AND FORECLOSURE
A. Overview
Separate from but not independent of the problem of
abandonment is the phenomenon of tax delinquency. Certainly
property can be neglected and vacated while the landlord continues
to pay property taxes., but a building is not truly abandoned as
long as the taxes are being paid. Since tax foreclosure is the
city's one instrument for halting the deterioration of marginal
properties in private hands, an understanding of the process is
important to this study. This chapter explains real estate tax
policy, and how property tax foreclosure affects low income
housing in New York City. Lastly it looks at the status of property
in the Southside to determine the impact, today and in years to
come, of tax foreclosure. It becomes clear that the city's
willingness to enforce its own tax laws is integral to the success
of any programs treating the in rem housing stock.
Threatened seizure of tax-delinquent properties is, for most
cities, the means of enforcing tax collection. Such seizures,
like bank foreclosures, are in rem actions, or actions "against
the thing," in which title to the property is vested but no
further claim against the owner is made. In rem actions, which
obligate the city only to inform owners by sending notices to the
address on the building registration record, are preferred to in
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personam lawsuits, which must be done individually and require
that the owner be served personally with all legal papers. While
in personam actions might be more effective for recovering lost
tax dollars, they would be burdensome to any city with more than a
token tax foreclosure case load.
It is hard to say just what role real estate tax payments
play in the abandonment process. Studies of owners of marginal
properties do not suggest that property tax burdens are the
deciding factor when a landlord walks away from his investment.
In fact, studies that correlate taxes with likelihood of
abandonment find that landlords with higher tax burdens are less
likely to abandon. Of course, this does not imply that property
owners desire higher taxes; it only underscores the self-evident
point that owners of more valuable properties are less likely to
walk away from their investments.
Tax delinquency need not be a sign of disinvestment. If late
payment penalties are below market interest rates,- many property
owners will be slow in their payments since it costs them less, in
effect, to "borrow" money from the city than the bank. Since few
cities have uniform or expeditious foreclosure policies, there is
little incentive to be punctual in real estate tax payments. It
is thus possible that some degree of tax delinquency can exist and
not indicate any problems in an area's housing market.
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High rates of tax delinquency are generally associated with
abandonment, however, and indicate a housing market so weak that
owners are willing to lose their property. A rule of thumb in
business is that a firm must cover all variable costs in order to
operate; fixed costs can be put off for a period. Since property
taxes constitute a fixed cost, it is likely that a marginal
landlord will stop paying taxes before defaulting on such
1
operating expenses as fuel or salaries. After all, the oil
company will cut off his credit a lot faster than the city will
foreclose on his building. Therefore, nonpayment of taxes is not
likely to be the final indicator of the abandonment process. But
neither is it the first indicator. Most building systems require
periodic upgrading, but can continue to operate for some time even
without proper maintenance. For instance, a roof can be patched
rather than re-papered; boiler tubes can be capped rather than
replaced. While title vestings for nonpayment of taxes occur
every few years, such deferred maintenance can go on for a dozen
years before a major system gives out.
B. Tax Delingugngy in New York City
New York City is one of the few municipalities that regularly
forecloses on delinquent properties, and is nearly unique in its
willingness to seize occupied buildings. Pittsburgh and
Cleveland, two other cities with tax payment problems, backed off
from ambitious proposals that would have left them responsible for
2
abandoned property . In Boston, tax foreclosures are ad hoc,
occurring only if there is interest in a particular parcel. I
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found no references to clear-cut foreclosure procedures in any
city other than New York., and no other city has policies and
programs dealing specifically with occupied in rem buildings. It
may be that the severity of New York's abandonment problem has
forced this city to pursue a more aggressive strategy, but in fact
New York has a lower percentage of abandoned units than other
cities, including Boston, that do not foreclose on thousands of
tax-delinquent buildings each year.
Tax delinquency to the point of foreclosure was first noted
as a problem in New York City during the Depression, at which time
the Citizens Housing Council published a study linking tax
deliquency with other symptoms of urban blight . A change in the
state Administrative Code in 1948 allowed the city, for the first
time, to foreclose directly on delinquent properties. This power
was used sparingly until the mid-1960s, although landlord
abandonment was noted much earlier. At this time computerization
of tax records streamlined the foreclosure process, making it
possible to foreclose on delinquent properties in an entire
borough in one year. By law, any property that owed more than
three years of taxes was eligible for foreclosure.
The fiscal crisis of 1975 focused attention on all aspects of
the city's fiscal management, including its collection of property
taxes. Part of the revenue shortfall that brought New York City
to the brink of bankruptcy was its overestimate of potential real
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estate tax receipts for that fiscal year by some $46 million
Concern over growing delinquency rates was instrumental in City
Council's passage of Local Law 45, which allowed the city to begin
foreclosure proceedings on any property that owed more than four
quarters of taxes. Some council members, particularly those
involved in community-based revitalization efforts, saw the
acceleration of the title vesting process as a way to alter the
involvement of city government in low-income housing. More likely,
however, the majority of those on the City Council voting for
this bill were anxious to "send a signal to Albany" that they were
serious about pursuing all revenue collecting alternatives, and
believed that a shorter grace period would simply prod landlords
5
into paying their taxes more promptly
In fact, Local Law 45 had the dual effect of improving tax
payments and pushing unprecedented numbers of buildings into city
ownership. For those owners interested in keeping their
properties, yearly foreclosures limited the number of quarters
they can afford to wait before paying their taxes. Buildings on
the verge of being abandoned entered city ownership that much
sooner. Thus the results satisfied the objectives of the
disparate proponents: those concerned with fiscal responsibility
could point to improved collections (see Table 2.1) and those
advocating public intervention in deteriorating buildings could
see an immediate increase in the number of units in city
management programs. Since the sudden increase in city-owned
property in 1978-1980, immediately following the law's passage,
the number of buildings going in rem each year has been falling
(See Table 2.2).
Tax Delinguency Rates, 1Z4-1984
(OOOs)
Fiscal Year
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
%Not Collected
$2,897,460
NA
NA
3,378,611
3, 318,583
3,329,998
3,499, 080
3,798,604
3.996,383
4,200,567
6.9
7.5
6.8
4.7
3.6
3.6
3.7
3.2
2.9
3.0
From Moody's Municigal and Government Manual
(as reported by the City Comptroller)
Table 2.2
Year
1978
1978
1978
1979
1980
1980
1980-81
1981
1982-84
1984
1985
In Rem Actions Since Passage of Local Law 45
Borough (Action #)*
Staten Island(35)
Manhattan(29)
Bronx(31)
Brooklyn (32)
Queens(37)
Staten Island(36)
Manhattan (30)
Bronx(32)
Brooklyn(33)
Queens(38)
Bronx(33)
Estimated Total
Buildings Taken
536
2167
3947
7331
1677
131
813
1121
5824(est)
826 (est)
771 (est)
25,144
From Fourth Annual In Rem
interview with Howard Hecht.
RegCt, and
*In Rem Actions numbered sequentially by borough.
Table 2.1
In spite of these successes, Local Law 45 was never enforced
after the vestings of 1978-79. While the city retains the
authority to vest any property owing a year of taxes, in fact they
wait at least three years between in rem actions. The official
explanation for these delays centers on the expense and difficulty
of taking title to and managing thousands of new properties each
year (see Chapter Four). It is also likely that the improved real
estate market in many areas qbviated the need for an immediate
foreclosure threat to enforce property tax payments. With the
fiscal responsibility advocates no longer concerned about tax
delinquency, only low-income housing advocates from those
neighborhoods where abandonment has not abated--not a powerful
constituency--are pushing for city involvement.
Further complicating the relationship between tax
delinquency, abandonment and foreclosure policy is the spread of
gentrification. Just three or four years ago tenant leaders in
most low-income neighborhoods tenant leaders could be certain that
any building with poor services and numerous code violations also
had accumulated tax arrears, and would be taken by the city in the
next title vesting. Today this is true in fewer neighborhoods.
Wherever there exists the first whisper of market revitalization
property owners will resume tax payments. Poor services may be
an indication, not of the owner's intention to abandon, but of his
or her plan to empty the building of its present, presumably low-
income minority tenants in order to rent to more affluent
newcomers. The effects of upgrading tenantry are significant in
many neighborhoods; while it bodes well for the general fiscal
health of the city, it does not mean an improvement in the living
conditions of those that inhabited the area in its dark days. In
fact, in some areas, buildings taken by the city in earlier days
are now the only remaining low cost rentals. Only the presence of
city-owned buildings keeps these neighborhoods economically
integrated.
City-wide statistics may reflect-an encouraging trend toward
prompt tax payments, but they mask the fact that in some
neighborhoods tax delinquency is still rampant. Responsible owners
continue to flee, selling buildings to "milkers" (see Chapter One)
or simply abandoning them. In these areas both the speed with
which the city forecloses on deteriorating properties and the way
in which it manages and disposes of the buildings it owns have a
powerful impact on the community; in fact, in these areas the
city is by far the largest landlord. The data presented below
shows that in the Southside, and presumably in other
neighborhoods, the length of time between foreclosure actions
allows hundreds of housing units to deteriorate and become vacant.
Since those that do enter city ownership are successfully treated
and form the still shaky backbone of neighborhood revitalization
efforts, it would behoove city officials to take action against
occupied, deteriorating properties as early in the abandonment
process as possible.
C. City wnersh i2 and Tax Delinguency in the Southside
A portrait of city ownership patterns and building conditions
in the Southside demonstrates the impact of city action--or
inaction--on one neighborhood. Of buildings and vacant parcels
that can be classified as residential, 27"4 are city-owned (see
Table 2.3); the percentage of dwelling units controlled by the
city is even higher, since the small buildings are more typically
owner-occupied and less likely to become in rem. Clearly,
programs affecting city-owned property would have a considerable
impact on this community.
The number of city-owned parcels is not surprising given the
depressed condition of the private market in Williamsburg over the
past fifteen years. More striking is that 40.6% of all property,
city- and privately-owned, is vacant. This comes to some eleven
to fifteen vacant buildings or lots on each tax block. However
successful the programs that treat the 73 Southside buildings
currently under city ownership, their impact is dwarfed by the
presence of 456 vacant properties. Each vacant unit represents
one lost to low-incoming housing for the foreseeable future.
Public rehabilitation or new construction programs for low-income
families no longer exist; were the market to grow strong enough to
attract private investment, it would exclude most current
Southside residents.
Table 2.3 City god Private Ownershig in the Southside
Total Residential Parcels*
City owned
Privately owned,
vacant lot
Privately owned,
vacant building
1122
308 (27%)
174 (15.5%)
47 (4X)
Privately owned, occupied 590 (52.6%)
*Estimated, using maps and surveys. It is difficult to determine
whether a vacant lot was once the site of a residential building;
a lot is considered residential if the surrounding buildings are
residential. Buildings with both commercial and residential units
are considered residential, but loft buildings that have recently
attracted illegal residential tenants are not.
Table 2.4 Vacant Lots and Buildings
Total Residential Parcels
Vacant lots
Vacant buildings
1122
313 (27.9%)
143 (12.7%)
3 6
Table 2.5 City-Owned Progerty
Total City-Owned Parcels 308
Vacant lots 139 (45'4)
Vacant buildings 96 (31%)
Occupied buildings 73 (24%)
Central Management 35
Alternative Management 24
Tenant-owned cooperative 14
Sources: Survey, and New York City
Department of Housing Preservation
and Development, Office of Property
Management.
Since HPD seldom evacuates occupied properties (only two
Southside buildings were closed after the last vesting action;
each was a large, seriously deteriorated structure with only one
or two remaining tenants), the assumption is the the buildings
are vacant by the time the city takes them (See Table 2.5) There
is an active demolition program, so an in rem action would include
many more vacant buildings and fewer empty lots. Thus, any
public policy that is to have a serious impact on housing in the
Southside must intervene earlier in the abandonment process,
before a building becomes vacant. Given the state of the private
market described in Chapter One, it is unlikely that incentives to
landlords such as property tax abatements and low-interest loans
would have a major impact on abandonment. The alternative is to
take the buildings out of for-profit management once the signs of
abandonment are clear, but while the buildings are still viable.
This was one of the goals of Local Law 45, and the authority
to seize title to properties with over four quarters of property
tax arrears remains the city's most potent weapon against
abandonment. Because several years are allowed to elapse between
title vestings, however, the reality is that no vesting papers
have been filed on buildings three or four years in arrears. In
Brooklyn the first post-Local Law 45 vesting took place in the
summer of 1979, the next one three years later in August,. 1982.
Today, no third vesting has even been scheduled, suggesting that
at the earliest it will take place is the spring or summer of
1987.
Vesting delays occur for several reasons. While the legal
work behind each vesting is not enormously time-consuming, the
legwork of visiting and assuming management of thousands of
buildings is. Currently vesting and management are handled by the
same HPD personnel, so an annual vesting would create perpetual
chaos. Furthermore, each vesting brings thousands of new units
under city management, adding expense and taxing the staff. Since
many occupied buildings remain in city ownership indefinitely,
buildings are not leaving their portfolio to make room for the new
ones. Given these considerations, it is not surprising that HPD
officials are reluctant to pursue a more vigorous foreclosure
policy.
Delaying foreclosures may lighten HPD's burden in the short
run, but in the long run it has its costs. In the time between
title vestings, buildings in the abandonment cycle become more
:38
dilapidated; their boilers give out, they lose units to f'ires, and
ultimately they are vacated. Because there are no accurate
records of the exact dates on which buildings become vacant, it is
impossible to calculate the precise number of units that could be
saved with faster foreclosures. But in the winter before the 1982
in rem action I did see five tenements, all with substantial tax
arrears and containing a total of 250 units, go from nearly full
occupancy to vacancy as services were withdrawn. There is no
adequate measure of the costs of displacement to these 250
families, or the cost to the neighborhood of another five vacant
buildings. For any of these units ever to provide housing again
would require an investment of between $40,000 and $70,000,
depending on the extent of destruction by exposure to the elements
and vandals. Had these buildings been vested two years earlier,
they would have needed only systems replacements and other
maintenance work, which could have been done for $10,000 a unit
with little disruption to the inhabitants.
Tax delinquency continues to be a problem in the Southside,
and tax delinquent buildings continue to be among the worst in the
neighborhood. As of last June, 216 buildings owed at least three
quarters of tax arrears, representing 36.6'. of the privately owned
housing (see Table 2.6). Many of the 174 privately owned lots
may also owe taxes, but these don't show up on HPD's records.
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Table 2.6 Tax Arrearage in Occugied Buildings
Total Privately Owned, Occupied Buildings 590
Quarters in Arrears:
3 51 (8.6%)
4-7 89 (15.1%)
8+ 76 (12.9%)
Source: New York City Department of City
Planning.
A profile of a sample of forty-nine of the tax-delinquent
buildigng in Table 2.6 reveals that they have an average of 10.4
units. This represents a skewed distribution of nine large
buildings with an average of 32.7 units each, and a large number
of small (three and four unit) buildings. While the irregularity
of housing inspections and the pickiness of many code violations
makes recorded violations a less-than-ideal measure of building
quality, the presence of several hazardous conditions (e.g., lack
of heat, exposed or frayed electrical wiring) in each building
suggests a serious level of deterioration. The sample buildings
have 35.5 violations each, or 3.5 violations per apartment. Of
these, four violations in each building (.4 per dwelling unit)- are
considered hazardous. An examination of the large buildings alone
reveals there are slightly fewer violations (3.24) but more
hazardous violations (.45) per dwelling unit. In addition,
tenants in 20% of the tax delinquent buildings have complained to
a local tenant advocacy group about poor services in the past
year.
A comparison of the scope of tax delinquency today and three
years ago shows that very little has changed. The last Brooklyn
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in rem action was held in 1982, encompassing buildings fallen into
arrears since the 1979 action. 193 Southside buildings were
eligible to be taken, and 93 of those (mostly the smaller ones),
or 48.1%, were subsequently redeemed by their owners (see Appendix
Two for an explanation of the redemption process). This is not
consistent with the city-wide estimate that only 20% of those
6
eligible for foreclosure will ultimately become city-owned and
suggests that the Southside has fewer landlords putting off tax
payments without intending to lose their buildings.
Last June, three years after the last title vesting, 165
Southside buildings were four quarters in arrears and therefore
eligible for foreclosure. If the same percentage of landlords
were to redeem as had in 1982, a title vesting at that time would
have netted 85 buildings. In June there were also 51 buildings
owing three quarters. If these landlords had neglected their next
payment, then 216 buildings would have been eligible for in rem
action last fall, with an expected yield of 112 city-owned
buildings. Either figure is in the range of the 100 buildings
taken in 1982, and suggests that there has been little change in
the Southside from the 1979-82 period. Interestingly,. 23 of the
216 buildings currently in arrears were those scheduled to be
vested in 1982 and subsequently redeemed. This means that nearly
one-quarter of the 93 redemptions will once again be on the
vesting list in the next in rem action. Since the city has since
instituted a policy of "supplementary vestings" in which
properties that had been on the previous in rem list and whose
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owners had defaulted on their redemption agreements can be taken
into city ownership between official actions.
D.Conclusions
This overview of city-wide and neighborhood tax delinquency
and foreclosure trends suggests several policy directions. It
appears that the overall health of New York City's real estate
market is improving. My familiarity with some of New York's
neighborhoods, taken with the affordability data in Chapter 1,
suggests the following trends in New York City's housing market:
First, areas that have traditionally strong markets are getting
stronger. Second, some areas that in the mid-1970's had been
experiencing degrees of abandonment have now "turned around";
property values are up, tax delinquency down, and housing costs
are beyond the means of the low income. Meanwhile, some
neighborhoods have not experienced this upgrading, so remain
affordable to the poor but continue to suffer abandonment and show
high rates of tax delinquency. Tax foreclosure policy must be
sensitive to these different trends.
In traditionally strong areas tax delinquency has never been
a major concern. In these areas city officials are interested in
collecting sufficient taxes to support municipal services. In
transitional areas, the city treasury should be benefitting from
the increase in property values; buildings that had become city-
owned at an earlier time must be maintained as low-income housing.
It is in deteriorated areas that tax foreclosure becomes the
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Part II
major component of housing policy. The city must foreclose
frequently 
-- every other year at least--and be willing to conduct
interim vestings, taking title to buildings whose owners had
signed repayment agreements and defaulted. City foreclosures save
buildings before the abandonment process is complete, and city-
owned buildings can form the foundation of grassroots
revitalization efforts. If a neighborhood begins to attract
private interest--and even in the Southside this has begun to
happen--the city-owned stock will remain a low-income resource,
ensuring an integrated community. Now that the crisis is over and
landlord abandonment is slowing down, the city should be able to
deal with it more effectively where it is still occurring.
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CHAPTER THREE: ANTECEDENTS TO THE
IN REM HOUSING PROGRAM
Urban self-help housing grew out of the housing crisis that
confronted low-income, inner city tenants in the early 1970s. The
net result of urban renewal had been the loss of affordable
housing: by 1967, 404,000 low- and moderate-income units had been
1
destroyed, replaced by 41,580 units . The moratorium on
federally assisted housing had left a void in the creation of low-
income units not filled by city programs, which concentrated on
new, mixed-income developments such as Battery Park City and
Roosevelt Island, and on stabilization of transitional
2
neighborhoods . Low city-wide vacancy rates, the worsening
condition of private tenement housing, and restricted housing
opportunities for blacks and Hispanics created the conditions in
which poor tenants had little choice but to take action.
Tenants had been taking over their buildings from abandoning
landlords since the mid-1960s, if not earlier, and by the early
1970s many had found ways to renovate and purchase their buildings
as legal cooperatives. Why were they willing and able to take
over where their landlord had failed? According to Robert Kolodny
and Ronald Lawson, their confidence had been boosted by grassroots
empowerment movements. Kolodny maintains that "without the
assertion of consumer rights and the resurgence of neighborhood-
based voluntary action, it is unlikely that such a dramatic
reversal of roles would have emerged" . Furthermore, the urban
incarnation of the civil rights movement had focused directly on
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housing issues. The Harlem rent strike of 1962-3, which had
rapidly spread to other New York City ghettoes, had been initiated
4
by CORE organizers .
Civil rights unrest, for better or worse, exacerbated the
tension and distrust between black tenants and white landlords.
Owners interviewed by Stegman and Sternlieb who were afraid to
visit their properties (see Chapter One) may have been reacting
to their tenants' increased racial militance as well as their
certainty of their rights as renters. Residents' newly voiced
dissatisfaction may have hastened the creation of legal measures
that have since helped tenants take control of their buildings
before the city could take them in rem. These measures include
Receivership and Article 7a, both of which provide for the
appointment of an administrator to manage a property in place of
the landlord, and the Emergency Repair Program, which allows the
city to provide emergency services when the landlord is unwilling
5
and to place a lien on the property
A.Homeownershig fgr the Poor
The concept of tenant-initiated cooperative conversion in
New York City was built on two ideas that were in good currency
elsewhere: homeownership for the poor and self-help housing.
Homeownership for low-income families was undertaken on the
largest scale under Title 1 of the Housing and Development Act of
1968. Known as Section 235, this program consisted of payments on
behalf of the low-income homeowner by the federal government to
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mortgage holders in'order to reduce the interest rate to as low as
6
1. . One goal of 235 housing was to provide poor families with
alternatives to segregrated, institutional public housing: "The
same expenditure [as for public housing] (about $25,000 a unit)
could purchase a house in suburbia and a new car for the poor
7
family who could live much like anybody else" . Another goal,
based on the assumption that an owner-occupant would be more
inclined than a tenant to keep up his or her home, was to promote
improved housing within the inner city. The program's proponents
stressed the financial benefits of home ownership, such as tax
deductions and equity accumulation, as well as the psychological
benefits:
"Owning a home can increase responsibility and stake out a man's
place in his community. The man who owns a home has something to
be proud of and good reason to protect and preserve it"B.
With each summer -bringing a new wave of racial unrest to the inner
cities, a program encouraging the poor to invest in their
neighborhoods was welcomed.
Because section 235 was exclusively a program for purchasers
of single-family homes, it had little impact on New York City.
(Interestingly, however, two current projects--the Nehemiah
project in East New York and Charlotte Gardens in the South
Bronx--are using 235 mortgage subsidies to erect single-family,
factory-built houses on vacant land.) But the ideas represented
in Section 235 housing were considered by the sponsors of early
cooperative conversion projects. Cooperative ownership was seen
as the New York City equivalent of homeownership, and the benefits
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ascribed to homeowners were believed to accrue to coop
9
shareholders as well
B.Self-Helg Housing and Sweat EgUity
The concept known as self-help housing is hardly new, being
simply "participation by the family in the construction and
10
maintenance of their dwellings" . Its application by planners
in the late 1960s to the creation of low-cost urban housing,
however, was an innovation. Two trends emerged from this
application: urban homesteading, which generally involved the
occupation of vacant inner city houses in much the same spirit as
the push west by nineteenth-century pioneers. The second was
sweat equity, which substitutes labor for cash in the acquisition
and rehabilitation of property. While many urban homesteaders
undoubtedly used some form of sweat equity to make their homes
habitable, in this section sweat equity specifically refers to
organized, multi-family efforts.
Urban homesteading is not a low-income housing program per
se, and often homesteaders are more affluent than the inhabitants
in the neighborhoods into which they move. HUD, which sold
buildings on which it had foreclosed to homesteaders for as little
as a dollar, conducted a study of 241 program participants
throughout the country in 1978 and found that the homesteaders
were more affluent, more likely to be white, better educated and
less likely to be on public assistance than their neighbors. The
differential existed even though the program was executed only in
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11
areas that had not fallen into deterioration
In New York City the concept of homesteading, which was
thought of as a program for homeowners, was extended to multi-unit
buildings. The thrust of the New York City program differed
considerably from other homesteading initiatives. In the multi-
family projects, emphasis was on sweat equity rehabilitation
resulting in cooperative ownership. While other homesteaders were
often middle income people motivated as much by the investment
possibilities as by their need for shelter, the Sweat Equity
projects were comprised of low-income families, and the coops were
structured so that participants would not earn a profit. Whereas
homesteaders in other cities were subsidized only in the low
purchase price of their units, sweat equity homesteaders received
more extensive public subsidy.
Original New York Sweat Equity projects in the early 1970s
were of three varieties. The earliest kind was "pure" sweat
equity, which relied completely on participants' volunteer labor.
Later projects built labor stipends into their mortgages so that
participants could devote themselves to renovation work full-time.
Still later, CETA funds were used to pay participants. Low-income
residents could continue to afford these projects, with the
assistance of subsidies at many levels. They purchased buildings
from the city for $100 a unit, and received rehabilitation
financing at below the market rate through the Municipal Loan
Program. The Municipal Loan Program was replaced by the
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Participation Loan Program, which mixed Community Development
Funds, lent at 5%., with a conventional loan to keep interest rates
low. There was no contractor's or developer's fee; the projects
were coordinated by a city agency and non-profit sponsors.
Professional services were usually donated by lawyers and
architects who were excited by these projects.
C.EarEly New York City Cogati yes
A 1973 study identified 72 New York City projects containing
5200 units that either had attained cooperative status or were in
12
the conversion process . The projects ranged from those
initiated by sponsoring organizations to prevent disinvestment in
transitional neighborhoods ("preventative conversions") to those
initiated by tenants in landlord-abandoned buildings situated in
severely deteriorated neighborhoods. While many of the projects
involved sweat equity renovation of vacant buildings, as described
above, others, like today's in rem buildings, were comprised of
current tenants more concerned with gaining control in the absence
of a responsible landlord than in participating in renovation
work.
Since programs and funding sources have changed since 1973, a
case-by-case look at early coops is not useful to this study.
More relevant is an understanding of both the motivation behind
the cooperative conversions and the factors contributing to their
success. Recognition of the benefits of homeownership to the
individual and to society motivated some of the sponsors of the
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preventative conversions, but it was assumed that the cooperative
model would not work for the very poor in deteriorated housing.
Not only were prospective sponsors concerned that the housing
stock was too dilapidated to lend itself to low-cost
rehabilitation, but they were further convinced that poor tenants
lacked the motivation and organizational skills to pull off such a
project.
The projects studied in 1973 defied these assumptions. Most
were precisely the kind viewed by experts as unworkable; they were
located in deteriorated buildings in neglected neighborhoods and
run by tenants with little formal training. These participants
were not even attracted to the presumed homeownership benefits;
they were interested simply in improving their living conditions
without forgoing affordable rents. Their efforts, as Kolodny
explains,
"owed little to a petit bourgeois interest in ownership
for its own sake or alternatively to a radical ideology that
advocated expropriation of private property and community
control. The central issue has been control at a level
sufficient to remedy painful housing conditions"(13).
That those seeking remedy worked in isolation, unaware of similar
struggles in other buildings, further suggests that cooperative
conversion was a spontaneous response to desperate conditions.
These pioneering cooperatives, formed without the benefit of
public programs designed for that purpose, offered a number of
principles and lessons that were important in the creation of
official tenant-management programs. The early projects of the
1970s marked the beginning of the age of moderate rehabilitation,
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a necessity at a time when the billions of federal dollars needed
for clearance and new construction were becoming scarce. It had
previously been thought that moderate rehabilitation with tenants
in place was cumbersome and therefore expensive. However, the
move away from the big project mentality also denoted a
willingness on the part of housing officials to modify
rehabilitation standards so that less extensive renovation work
would be eligible for public funds. This willingness was critical
to the development of sweat equity methods.
In spite of the excitement and publicity they generated, low-
income coop conversions remained isolated cases until 1979. Early
conversions relied on ad hoc, experimental programs, each
involving a different group of participants and a different
financial package. Perennial delays were most perilous to the
sweat equity projects, since participants could not move in until
rehabilitation was complete. Indeed, many of the projects
identified in 1973 never achieved conversion due to such delays.
Some were halted in mid-renovation by the 1975 fiscal crisis,
during which all municipal loan programs collapsed.
While official delays prevented some tenants from realizing
their goal of conversion, internal factors accounted for those
that fell into trouble after conversion. The two biggest problems
have been lack of money and lack of training. The dearth of
management expertise in many of the cooperatives is due to the
scant attention given to pre-conversion training. Cooperatives
that were initiated by outside sponsors were often later
mismanaged by inexperienced tenants, but even those established
by the tenants themselves were later mismanaged by "persons who
were excellent leaders of struggles against landlords Ebut] did
14
not prove to be good leaders in management" An unfortunately
high number of early coops have fallen into financial difficulty,
with the majority owing property taxes and falling behind on loan
15
repayments
D.Early City-Sggngred Cooeratives
In spite of the early grassroots interest in cooperative
conversion, city sponsorship came slowly. In 1970 a Cooperative
Consultation Unit was formed within the Housing Development
Administration (HPD's predecessor) to advise low-income tenants
considering conversion, but the city itself did not sponsor any of
the early cooperatives. Its support for conversion efforts first
evolved, in fact, by default, with the failure of the Receivership
Program. This program, in which the city's Department of Real
Estate stepped in by court order to manage properties no longer
receiving services from their landlords, was in charge of twenty
buildings in 1970; by 1972 it was burdened with over 200
buildings. The DRE managers were especially ill-equipped to handle
these troubled properties. Community groups, which had gained
clout and sophistication, persuaded HDA to contract with them for
the management of buildings in Receivership. As community-managed
Receivership buildings began to go in rem, the Community
Management Program was conceived.
The CMP's initial plan was as follows: The city would
transfer the building to the community group, the group would
receive a Municipal Loan for rehabilitation, and when work was
completed the building would be sold to the tenants. But
community groups balked at the notion of purchasing
unrehabilitated properties. They were familiar enough with the
uncertainties of municipal funding to suspect that the
rehabilitation process might take years, leaving them responsible
for these buildings for an indefinite period. The program was
changed to provide for repairs before sale. Between the cut-off
of the Municipal Loan funding and the uncertainty and red tape of
the program's administration, however, no sales took place until
1979. An example of the kind of delays encountered in the early
CMP is the fate of 149 South 4th Street, a Southside building.
The first building to enter Community Management as a Receivership
building in 1973, it was not sold to the tenants until 1982. As
the program exists now, buildings are conveyed directly to the
tenants after rehabilitation. Community groups only rarely become
owners themselves.
In 1975 the Direct Sales Program was established to enable in
rem tenants to purchase their buildings directly from the city.
Simple in theory, this program was impossibly complex in practice:
before sale, tenants were expected to sign a management contract
16
for control of their building consisting of some 32 documents
Disposition procedures were never clarified and sales prices never
determined. In short, the record of city sponsorship of low-
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income coops before 1978 was dismal: two coops in five years.
Thus, in spite of the growing interest through the 1970s in
cooperative conversion as a response to landlord abandonment, city
officialdom remained aloof. The predecessors of the current in
rem tenant management programs had no significant impact until
long after the cooperative movement had gained its own momentum.
The programs that did exist, along with other homesteading
programs for vacant buildings., were understaffed, underfunded and
underestimated as viable solutions to the shortage of decent low-
income housing.
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CHAPTER FOUR: CREATION OF CURRENT
IN REM HOUSING PROGRAMS
A. The Office of Progerty Management
By the late 1970s the City of New York was faced with a
crisis. Abandonment was at its peak and the fast foreclosure law
had made every residential property with a four-quarter tax debt
-- tens of thousands of units, many of them occupied--eligible for
foreclosure. The traditional means of disposing of in rem
properties had been to sell them at auction. This approach was
favored because it enabled the city to return the building to the
private sector quickly, absolving the city of extensive management
responsibilities and generating income that could compensate for
the lost tax revenues.
But New York's experience with auction sales had proved
troublesome. A 1978 report documented that properties sold at
auction more often than not ended up back in city ownership. Four
years after sale, 94% of former city-owned parcels were in tax
arrears; 54% were at least four quarters in arrears and therefore
eligible for foreclosure, and 25% had paid no taxes at all.
Perhaps a worse indictment of the auction program was that 44% of
the buildings that had been occupied at sale no longer afforded
1
adequate housing . While some purchasers, naive about the
responsibilities of property ownership, may have gotten in over
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their heads, the assumption was that many of the defaulting
purchasers were slumlords who bought properties without any
intention of properly maintaining them (see the description of
"the Operator" in Chapter One for more details). In response to
the disastrous consequences of auction sales, the city declared a
moratorium on them in 1978. Since then no occupied buildings have
been sold by auction. Sales of vacant properties have been
resumed, with the added stipulation that bidders file disclosure
statements revealing the condition of other properties in which
they have had or currently have an interest. The failure of
auction sales underscored the disintegration of the private market
in poor neighborhoods, and left the city owner of thousands of
properties without any means to dispose of them.
Before 1970 city ownership had been limited to a few
buildings. By 1978 some neighborhoods were dominated by city-
owned property, and tax delinquency was spreading to previously
stable areas. When the in rem stock had been small, its
management had been seen as just another aspect of municipal
administration and, like all city property management, had been
handled by the Department of Real Estate (later to become the
Division of Real Property under the Department of General
Services). But the logarithmically increasing workload proved to
be beyond the capacity of the DRE, and horror stories of tenants
freezing in city-owned buildings became distressingly common. At
the same time, community organizations in neighborhoods with
abundant city-owned stock were insisting that this landlord-
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abandoned property presented an opportunity for the development of
alternative management and ownership for low-income tenants. In
response to these pressures, City Council passed Local Law 3 in
1978, shifting responsibility for the management and disposition
of in rem residential.properties from DRE, an administrative
bureaucracy, to the Department of Housing Preservation and
Development, the recently created housing policy agency. One
council member explained the rationale for the shift: "'That's
supposed to be EHPD's] area of expertise. We figured they
2
couldn't do a worse job [than the DRE3'"
It is hard to convey the confusion and anxiety of housing
officials during this period. They were potentially responsible
for up to 30.000 substandard buildings sheltering the city's most
indigent and troubled families. They had to see that all the
information about these buildings was somehow transferred from one
large bureaucracy to another. Had they been experienced real
estate managers these buildings would have posed problems for
them; and they worked for a public agency that had few trained
personnel and no management system. As the fate of tax-foreclosed
housing became front page news in 1978 and early 1979, press
coverage of this issue conveyed a sense of impending doom: "The
same sixty managers who are now incapable of managing 6,000
properties (100 properties per person) will now try their skills
upon 534 properties per person, or nearly 3 ,800 units of housing
3
per manager!" . The resulting crisis facilitated the creation of
the institutions necessary to carry out the city's new and
uncomfortable responsibility as landlord of last resort.
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OCCUPIED IN REM BUILDINGS (UNITS) BY PIOGPAM, FY 1979 - FY 1983
FY 1979 FY 1980 FY 1981 FY 1982
11,717 (166,184) NA 8,800 (NA) 8,289 (NA) 9,580 (NA)
3,681 (26,512)
411 (8267)
130
226
NA
NA
0
(2500)
(5683)
(820)
(735)
4,197 (38,950)
3,547 (23,745)
645 (15,205)
230
316
33
66
(5645)
(7058)
(1302)
(1200)
3,870 (37,462)
3,223 (22,675)
647 (14,787)
219
333
48
47
5 (82)
(4409)
(8082)
(1363)
(933)
50 (1632)
3,727 (36,229)
3,204 (25,292)
523 (10,937)
165 (3535)'
311 (7458)
47 (1471)
112 (2263)
3,945 (38,677)
3,430 (26,739)
515 (11,938)
158 (3402)
291 (6636)
41 (1469)
104 (3049)
Frcm New York City Department of Housing Preservation
and Developmnt, "In Rem Program Annual Report" numbers
1 through 5.
'IIAL
'Ibtal Occup. 4,092 (34,779)
DPM
DAMP
FY 1983
CMP
TIL
POMP
OTHER
SALES
Ta-ble 4. 1
I
Department of Housing Preservation
and Development
DIVISION OF P10PERI
Office of Property Management
MAGEMEN DIVISION OF ALTENATIVE MAGEENT
Responsible for all Central
Management buildings.
Tenant Interim Leasing Private ownership and
Managenent Program
Comnunity Management Program
Although programs have been altered and improved since 1979.,
today's In Rem Housing Program, outlined in Figure 4.1 and Table
4.1, is essentially identical to that which emerged at that time.
Most tenants in city-owned buildings continue to be managed by HPD
through its Division of Property Management (DPM) much as they
were before 1979. But 13X of these buildings, containing 31% of
all occupied dwelling units, are in one of three areas of the
Division of Alternative Management Programs (DAMP). One of these,
the Private Ownership and Management Program (POMP) hires private
real estate professionals to manage and purchase in rem buildings.
The other two, the Community Management Program (CMP) and Tenant
Interim Leasing (TIL) are outgrowths of the grassroots, urban
"self-help" housing movement discussed above, and are designed to
sell buildings to tenant cooperatives.
B. The Division of Progerty Management: Public Landlord
Buildings administered by HPD are managed tra'ditionally, with
the Division of Property Management acting as landlord.
Immediately after the city takes title, all buildings enter what
is known as Central Management. Those that eventually enter
Alternative Management must apply to (in the case of TIL) or be
selected from (in the case of of CMP and POMP) Central Management.
Property managers, located at nine site offices, are each
responsible for a list of buildings. Basic services are provided;
repairs are done as needed. Tenants pay their rent to HPD either
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by mailing it or by delivering it to the site office or one of
the several banks that accept these payments.
Because centrally managed buildings are operated like
traditional rental housing, they encounter the same difficulties,
plus some. Tenants complain of poor services, and property
managers complain of dismal rent collection figures. Indeed, both
sides have a point. Centrally managed buildings are the least
desirable buildings in the in rem stock, and their rent collection
is by far the poorest. This is because Central Management is not
a program but a default option. Its portfolio consists of
properties united only in their inability to inspire anyone,
landlord or tenant group, to want to own them.
Since there is no data comparing the conditions of in rem
buildings across programs, much of the information regarding the
comparatively deteriorated state of Central Management property is
anecdotal. Certain statistics, however, do suggest factors that
would lead to the their troubled state. These buildings have the
fewest units (16.1 per building) and have the smallest apartments
(4.2 rooms per unit) of all in rem stock. They have the fewest
commercial spaces and the lowest commercial occupancy (72.2%).
They also have high residential vacancy rates, 23.4%, compared to
a city-wide vacancy rate of 2.04%, and close to 1.0% for
apartments renting for under $250 a month. It is not surprising
to find that they have the lowest assessed value of all city-owned
4
buildings . Yet Central Management buildings are expensive to
run. An estimated $3300 to $3400 a year, or nearly $300 a month,
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is spent on each dwelling unit. Although this is 150% higher
5
than the real estate industry standard , the poor building
conditions necessitate frequent emergency repairs. Rents do not
cover expenses: Tenants pay on average $44 a room monthly, or
$184.80 for an average (4.2 room) apartment; break-even has been
6
estimated at $70 a room, or $294.00 for an average apartment
Since city-owned buildings are not subject to rent regulations
rents could be legally increased; but because HPD officials
believe those in centrally managed buildings are among the poorest
of all in rem tenants, whose median income is just over $8,000 a
7
year , they are probably the least able to absorb a rent increase.
50% of them are on public assistance--compared to 25% of those in
8
alternative management buildings, 25% of all NYCHA tenants , and
9
14.3% of renters city-wide . Therefore Central Management runs a
deficit which was as high as $11.8 million in FY 1980, and is down
10
to $6 million in FY 1983 . The deficit is made up by federal CD
funds and city tax levy revenues.
If the centrally managed portfolio weren't troubled enough,
its position as unwanted stepchild of in rem management further
exacerbates its difficulties. City policy-makers, seemingly
motivated by the belief that if you ignore a problem it will go
away, have until recently refused- to engage in any long-term
planning for the approximately 32,000 occupied units currently in
Central Management. In every policy statement officials continue
their reassurances that the objective of in rem policy is to
return buildings to private ownership, but seldom acknowledge the
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existence of some 30,000 units stuck in Central Management.
Unwillingness to invest in buildings for which there is no
private or community interest is in part due to the notion that a
municipality should not be a landlord. Since the fiscal crisis
New York City officials have been reluctant to overstep
traditional functions of municipal governments, believing it was
such benificence that depleted the city treasury ten years ago.
The further assumption of policy-makers is that the private sector
can run things more efficiently than a public agency; those in the
real estate industry seem especially eager to point out the city's
11
management shortcomings . HPD should therefore be seeking ways
to rid itself of its management responsibilities as quickly as
possible.
In spite of these arguments, the city must accept long-term
responsibility for its large rental stock. The simple fact is
that HPD owns this property, and this is unlikely to change in the
foreseeable future. With the shortage of affordable apartments in
the city, it would behoove housing planners to examine the
potential of these units. A moderate rehabilitation strategy
could prove cost effective by improving rent collections and
decreasing operating costs. Most of the Central Management stock
has been rejected by the private sector, and has few features that
would attract it back without massive subsidies. The POMP
program, discussed below, which offers private managers the
opportunity to purchase in rem properties, succeeds because it
"creams" the most attractive of these buildings and ignores the
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others. The fact is that there are properties which, due to their
size, their layout, the extent of disrepair or the
uncooperativeness of their tenants are neither attractive to
private owners nor suited to tenant self-management. Yet tenants
in these buildings are entitled to adequate services, and it is in
the city's interest to provide these as efficiently as possible.
In the past few years the city has in fact improved its
management capabilities. Each year the In Rem Housing Program
Annual Report proudly documents increased productivity among its
workers and fewer heatless days in its buildings (in 1981 it took
an average of 2.1 days to restore heat, compared to 14 days in
12
1980) . When DPM first began managing buildings in 1978,
hardly anyone paid rent; legal tenants never got billed, bills
were sent to tenants who didn't exist, and the system that
insisted that tenants mail checks to a central office was
unworkable for people who were accustomed to paying a landlord
cash, in person. Today, better record-keeping and a more
flexible rent payment system, along with better service delivery,
have led to an improvement in rent collections from a meager 36.9%
13
in FY 1979 to a barely respectable 72.0% in FY 1982 . Tenants in
some buildings have even begun to organize through the Union of
City Tenants, and managers of some of the site offices seem
pleased to deal with these tenant groups rather than constantly
14
having to respond to individual complaints
These improvements point to a tacit acknowledgement on the
part of some HPD officials that centrally managed buildings are a
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long-term city responsibility, and several recent initiatives
underscore this commitment. In his recent budget request, Mayor
Koch included the allocation of capital funds for in rem buildings
(see Chapter Eight), opening up a new revenue source for repairs.
The dramatic plight of the homeless has inspired HPD to renovate
vacant apartments in Central Management buildings for Welfare
clients living in shelters or hotels. So far 4,000 apartments
have been completed; the per unit renovation cost of a few
thousand dollars represents a.savings for the city, whose Human
Resources Administration pays over $1000 a month for an inadequate
hotel room.
While any renovation of these buildings is welcomed, this
program is designed primarily to address the needs of homeless
families, and is a program for in rem housing only secondarily.
Long-term tenants express frustration at the fact that in New York
you have to be homeless to raise public concern over your living
15
conditions . A tenant who has lived with leaking pipes and
peeling paint for years, perhaps struggling against a landlord's
neglect and pressuring the city for repairs, must be puzzled to
see the apartment next door completely renovated for a newcomer.
The homeless program is a necessary one, but it is a very small
step toward the acceptance of city-owned buildings as permanent
fixtures in the New York City rental housing picture.
In sum, city policy toward its management portfolio denotes
some ambivalence. Responding on the one hand to tenants and their
advocates who demand decent housing, and on the other to critics
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who call for a withdrawal of the city from the housing management
business, public officials continue to provide management services
but are reluctant to plan for the long-term viability of its
rental property. Unfortunately this shortsightedness is
expensive., as high maintenance costs are the result of inadequate
repair plans for the centrally managed buildings. Perhaps,
spurred by the growing numbers of homeless families, these
buildings will begin to be maintained as a resource for low-income
families in years to come.
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CHAPTER FIVE: CREATION OF THE DIVISION OF ALTERNATIVE
MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS: APPLICATIONS OF SELF-HELP
HOUSING MODELS TO MANAGEMENT OF
CITY-OWNED PROPERTY
The large in rem actions in 1978, coupled with the moratorium
on auctions, created a backlog of city-owned buildings. HPD
became interested in any program that could lessen its management
load. So DAMP was established, consisting of a reinvigorated
Community Management Program, an overhauled Direct Sales Program
renamed Tenant Interim Leasing, and a staff of self-help housing
movement leaders. Soon after two new programs were started: one
was the Private Ownership and Management Program (POMP), and
another was the Housing Authority Management Program (HAMP)--
similar to POMP but with NYCHA acting as contractor--which was
terminated in 1982. When DAMP opened its doors on September 1,
1978, its portfolio consisted of 85 buildings containing 1700
units. By the end of that year, responding to pressure from HPD
to get as many buildings out of Central Management as possible, it
1
had expanded to 413 buildings with 8200 units . In the midst of
this crisis city officials were willing to overcome their
suspicion of new forms of housing management: "After initially
viewing these initiatives with great skepticism, the New York City
government has begun actively encouraging tenant takeover, partly
because the city doesn't know what else to do, and doesn't enjoy
2
being a slumlord itself"
In the Southside, 24 of the occupied, city-owned buildings
are currently in alternative management programs--ten in CMP and
14 in TIL. An addition 14 have completed either TIL or CMP and
are now legal cooperatives. Since the alternative management
buildings are., on average, larger than Central Management
buildings, most likely more than half the city-owned units are in
alternative managment. This is a higher than the city-wide figure
of one-third of all occupied units in alternative managment. This
probably indicates the degree of tenant organization in the
Southside, where a local community group, Southside United
Housing, has been active for over twelve years. Typically, large
buildings have tenant associations by the time they become city-
owned, and therefore their entry into alternative management is
quite natural. Approximately 760 Southside households now live in
city-sponsored, tenant- or community-managed buildings. Tenants
from ten of these buildings were interviewed for this study.
Their comments are interwoven throughout the following sections.
A. The Community Management Prgrgam
Community Management and Tenant Interim Leasing are the two
programs based on self-help housing models. In Community
Management, community-based organizations (CBOs) receive contracts
to manage and rehabilitate city-owned properties in their service
areas. Generally a, contract will include five to twelve
buildings, or 100 to 300 units, providing operating subsidies and
a management fee. As of Fiscal Year 1983, there were twenty-two
CBOs with contracts. Under the contract terms the groups hire a
management and maintenance staff to collect rent and make repairs.
Rehabilitation work of up to $20,000 per unit is usually done by
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subcontractors., although recently, in a money-saving effort, in-
house maintenance crews have also been doing renovations. When
rehabilitation is complete, tenants are expected to purchase their
apartments for a predetermined price of $250 per unit. (See
Appendix 3 for a detailed explanation of sales terms.)
By involving CBOs, CMP becomes not just a housing program,
but one with secondary functions of organizational development and
job creation. Measures of its success include tenants' favorable
comparisons of life under Community Management with other housing
experiences, demonstrated by high rent collections (88%) and
occupancy rates (87%) . Because the program provides sufficient
funds for a moderate level of rehabilitation it can produce
attractive apartments. Through CMP community groups have been
able to provide secure employment with good benefits to local
residents. Money spent on maintenance and rehabilitation
materials and salaries is circulated in the local economy.
Like any program with multiple goals, Community Management
lends itself to extensive criticism from all sides. CMP is the
most expensive DAMP program. It has the largest budget and also
has by far the highest per unit costs of all DAMP programs,
receiving over 60% of the budget for management of 28% of the
portfolio and producing only 11% of the sold units. Of course,
this statistic says more about the underfunding of the other
programs than the costliness of CMP. At an average cost of
$16,000 per rehabilitated apartment, CMP costs are lower than
those of private developers. Tenants and community activists
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complain that CMP contractors behave too much like traditional
landlords, performing adequately as managers but failing to train
tenants to assume responsibility themselves. As a result, tenants
take possession of their buildings without any notion of how to
run them, and CBO staff struggle in their uncomfortable landlord
role.
CBOs complain that management responsibilities affect all
Ap@6t§ 9f th@iF es@Fatie@ FP a group to be rated well by HPD
as a CMP contractor it must be prompt and accurate in its
reporting, achieve high rent collections, and dispose of buildings
4
quickly . Success by these measures could force a group to
abandon the role in which it most likely gained credibility in the
neighborhood--that of tenant advocate and community organizer.
Some groups depend on their CMP contracts for a significant
portion of their budget. It is unavoidable that this dependence
will make a group think twice before engaging in organizing
activities that may lead to confrontations with city officials.
This conflict of interest can ultimately damage the group in the
eyes of neighborhood residents. One original CMP contractor, a
Manhattan group called Housing Conservation Coordinators, decided
not to renew its management contract for just this reason,
stating:
'The basic philosophy of HCC has been to educate tenants
with the aim of tenant self-help.... Community Management'
has instead made HCC into a typical landlord's agent and has
impeded efforts in developing tenant self-help management'(5).
While HCC is the only group that refused to renew its contract,
other CBOs have voiced similar complaints about their
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participation in the program.
6
B. Tenant Interim Leasing
In the TIL program tenants sign a lease with the city which
gives them management control over their building. Upon signing
the lease, tenants must also sign a letter expressing intent to
purchase. As manager, the tenant association collects rents, and
uses this money to cover operating expenses. There are no
operating subsidies available. During the term of the lease, HPD
will generally replace one or two faulty systems and find enough
state weatherization money to tover the cost of window
replacement. The nature and extent of HPD-funded pre-sales
repairs is negotiated between DAMP and tenant leaders, but
expenditures seldom exceed $2,000 to $3,000 per unit. The unit
sales price for all TIL buildings is $250.00. (See Appendix 3)
Tenant associations in TIL are not formally tied to any
community institution, although many are involved with local
organizations and may depend on them for various kinds of
technical assistance. HPD has contracted with the Urban
Homesteading Assistance Board (UHAB), a city-wide group well-known
for its work with low-income cooperatives, to provide training for
tenants. Association leaders are expected to attend classes upon
entering the program, at which time they learn bookkeeping and
management skills, and before finalizing the building's purchase,
at which time they become familiar with the additional tasks
associated with ownership. When TIL buildings are clustered
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together and have a working relationship (usually through a mutual
connection with a CBO), UHAB can arrange training classes within
the neighborhood.
TIL is considered successful on several counts. First, it is
the most cost effective DAMP program, producing the most units for
sale at the lowest per-unit cost. It currently handles 55% of the
DAMP portfolio, accounting for only 19% of its budget. Second,
tenant satisfaction is high, often in spite of what appear to be
oppressive neighborhood and building conditions. Measuring tenant
satisfaction in a tenant-run building is tricky, since essentially
it requires asking tenants to rate themselves as managers. Rent
collections and occupancy rates are both over 90%, offering
objective proof of success. Interviews with TIL tenants all convey
the pride and commitment that these people bring to their -living
environment. They seem convinced that, considering the limited
housing options available to the poor, they are better off under
self-management. Said one respondent, asked to discuss the
housing situations of friends and relatives in the neighborhood,
"They live in [tenant-run buildings) or they are exploited by
7
landlords"
Major problems confronting most TIL buildings fall into two,
not unrelated categories. The first is leader burn-out. Since
TIL leaders often have functions beyond typical tenant association
members--negotiating with contractors, waiting for the plumber,
attending endless meetings, and all the while incurring the wrath
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of the uninvolved who blame them for anything that goes wrong--it
is not surprising that many begin to feel isolated and exhausted.
That few buildings have sufficient income to hire a manager, a
bookkeeper or a professional superintendent adds to the pressure
on the elected leaders. It follows that the second problem is
money. TIL is the only in rem program in which the rent roll is
expected to cover all operating expenses. It is also the only one
other than Central Management that doesn't have a rehabilitation
component. When DAMP was designed, its originators may have
envisioned TIL as a program for buildings that were practically
ready for sales, with few structural defects and a healthy rent
roll. In fact, TIL buildings are not, on average, significantly
better off either financially or physically than the other DAMP
buildings. Since TIL is the in rem tenant's only "as of right"
alternative to Central Management--entrance into POMP and CMP is
conditioned upon selection by the contractor--to restrict it to
sales-ready buildings is to deny the option of self-managment and
ownership to most in rem tenants.
C. Why Oelf-Hel?
CMP and TIL represent two means of arriving at the goal of
tenant cooperative ownership. But is this the appropriate
direction for the city's in rem housing policy? The next section
raises some of the arguments for and against reliance on a self-
help model to preserve low-income housing. It is followed by a
discussion of how well current DAMP programs realize their goal,
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and the outline of an alternative program that could be more
effective.
1.Critigues of Self-Helg: I
Critics on the right, among them many real estate
professionals, do not attack the efforts of tenants who are trying
to run their buildings. Instead, they question the efficacy of
centering a housing rehabilitation and management program around
that model. Their argument has two parts. First, the success of
one cooperative depends on the confluence of so many unreliable
factors--e.g., the tenants' good will, the lawyer's willingness
to volunteer services, etc.--that success is never guaranteed from
one project to the next. They question whether, under these
circumstances, success is replicable, or whether such projects
will be only token efforts. These critics claim secondly that the
private market is still the most efficient provider of housing.
If landlords were given the same boosts that the city now gives to
coops, such as grants for rehabilitation, low purchase price, and
adjusted rent levels, then they could produce more units at lower
cost with far less difficulty.
The first argument, concerning the replicability of the self-
help model, has some validity. When one talks to tenants in self-
management buildings, one is struck by the effort and dedication
that has gone into maintaining the building. Each building has
its story, usually beginning before city ownership, of an oatmeal-
patched boiler functioning through the winter, or a contractor
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finally repairing a collapsed roof after the tenant association
president's grandmother gave him a piece of her mind. Each tenant
association scrapes by because someone knows someone or has a
special skill. The "extras" that may allow a cooperative's
success can't be predetermined. Perhaps more difficult to
orchestrate than luck or special skills is the cooperation and
good will of the building residents. Even an economically viable
coop won't last too long if its members can't get along, or at
least leave their personal differences out of their business
dealings. All business relationships are conflictual, but when
the participants also share their living space they may become
especially contentious. When tenants are forced into collective
action at the time the landlord abandons'the building, they share
only the fact that at some point they all happened to rent an
apartment at the same address, and often, the fact that they are
of similar ethnic and economic backgrounds. To some degree a
tenant association resembles the cast of one of those formula
disaster movies, in which an unlikely group of people are thrown
into a life-threatening situation, escape from which depends on
their ability to work together.
In spite of these obstacles, DAMP programs do work in more
than a few cases. They are now being applied to 11,000 units
having already sold an additional 10,000 units. Not even in New
York could a program that is providing housing for 21,000 families
be considered a token effort. Why the model works so frequently
in spite of experts' skepticism is difficult to document.
Comments made by tenants reflect the spirit noted in the 1973
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survey of the early cooperatives which suggests simply that
tenants with few housing options are willing to work hard to keep
their buildings going. Those I interviewed referred continually
to their neighbors' fears of displacement due to arson,
abandonment or exorbitant rents, and seemed to draw inspiration
from the plight of those around them. These tenants were proud of
what they had accomplished, but seemed surprised that their
behavior, which to them is motivated by necessity and self-
interest, should seem extrordinary to others. Observed one
interviewer, "Too often people are disposed to deny as soft-headed
and sentimental reports that the poor are acting like other
people--protecting their vital interests as best they can and
8
banding together when the going gets rough"
The second criticism--that with similar incentives the private
sector could provide housing more efficiently--can be addressed
more concretely, for there is an HPD program that gives private
managers an opportunity to operate in rem housing. The Private
Ownership and Management Program, or POMP, entered the DAMP
repetory in 1979 after Mayor Koch suggested that there be a
mechanism for tapping private real estate expertise in the
management of in rem property. Initially there was little private
enthusiasm and much community skepticism about the program but
today it attracts more private firms than it can accommodate, and
criticism has been muted. The winner of a 1984 HUD award for
innovative use of CD Funds, POMP appears to be a well-designed,
well-administered program and is therefore a good model by which
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to test the effectiveness of private in rem management.
Under POMP, HPD contracts with real estate firms to manage
and purchase in rem buildings. Firms are solicited by Requests
for Proposals; last year there were eighty applicants from which
9
six firms were chosen . Applicants are carefully screened. HPD
looks for firms that are already involved in management of similar
buildings in the area, for whom the additional workload (usually
six to eight buildings, or 200 to 300 units) will not represent
more than one-third of their portfolio. Managers who have not
made payments on city repair agreements, who have been accused of
harrassing tenants, who have neglected code violations, or whose
buildings do not appear well-maintained upon inspection are not
chosen. HPD wants above all to avoid any intimation that POMP,
like the abandoned auction program, is reselling buildings to
owners that had once milked them.
POMP contractors sign a one-year agreement, at the end of
which the terms of purchase are negotiated. At the beginning of
the contract, the manager documents the anticipated income and
expenses, and with the help of POMP staff, determines the
expected shortfall. A "rent restructuring" (or rent increase)
plan is determined; in the meantime, HPD subsidizes any operating
deficit and pays a management fee as it does to contractors in the
Community Management Program. HPD also agrees to make systems
repairs that come to an average of $3500 to $4000 per unit;
subcontractors are chosen and supervised by the manager. At the
end of the year, the real estate firm is expected to purchase the
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entire portfolio it has been managing. Since 1979 the program has
used twenty-two contractors, and only two have failed to purchase
their portfolio. Restrictions extend beyond purchase: new rent
levels are determined by Rent Stabilization guidelines; and
buildings cannot be resold for five years without HPD approval.
While this program does not handle the same volume of units
as CMP or TIL, it succeeds in selling buildings faster and with
less effort than the others. At the end of Fiscal Year 83, 75
POMP buildings containing 4,000 units had been sold. Buildings in
the program are closely monitored by DAMP staff, and they are
generally well-managed, with 87X rent collection (second only to
TIL). However, a 1982 study found a sample of POMP buildings were
not as well-managed as might be expected considering the expertise
10
the professionals bring to them . There has been one court case,
Laureano v. Koch, in which tenants in one POMP building challenged
the arbitrary way in which HPD implemented its rent restructuring
plan, and charged that they were denied the option of purchasing
the building themselves. But this legal attack was aimed at HPD
policy; it did not question the effectiveness of the POMP manager
himself. There have been no complaints about the maintenance of
POMP buildings from tenant or community groups, both of which
could be expected to be vocal if criticism were deserved.
The success of POMP so far proves that carefully screened
managers, given adequate rents and new building systems, can run
buildings well. Does this mean that the POMP model should be
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expanded while tenant self-help is de-emphasized? To answer this
we must consider not what POMP does well but how long and how
extensively its measures can be applied.
POMP will not work in most in rem buildings, because most do
not meet the contractors' requirements. Peter Burgess, a Brooklyn
real estate manager, has a POMP contract of seven buildings, two
of which are in the Southside; he chose these from a long list of
potential buildings, most of which he deemed inappropriate. To
attract contractors, Burgess says, buildings must contain at least
30 units plus commercial space, and preferrably be located on a
commercial street so that storefronts can attract good rents. In
other words, POMP succeeds only in those buildings that have
qualities distinguishing them as potentially profitable--the
"cream" of the in rem stock. The typical city-owned building
would require more substantial subsidies to attract a private
owner.
Mr. Burgess prefers buildings with a number of vacancies,
because vacant apartments can be renovated using HPD money and
then rented for much more than current tenants are paying. High
rents paid by new tenants allow the manager to make money even
though old tenants continue to pay less. An example is 145 Grand
Street Extension, a thirty-unit Southside building that had
actually been run by a tenant association before becoming city-
owned. In September 1983, before it entered POMP, the building's
rent roll was $5197. In January 1985, after nine months in the
program, monthly rents totalled $8114. Mr. Burgess takes pride in
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the fact that this 150% improvement was accomplished without
increasing the rent of a single tenant in place. But while old
tenants., nearly all of whom are on public assistance, pay between
$170 and $220 for three- and four- room apartments, new tenants,
11
whom Mr. Burgess admits are "a different kind of tenant" , are
paying $375 for one bedroom and $425-450 for two bedrooms.
Two of the three other contractors interviewed in a 1982
survey also said that a change in tenancy was important to
successful buildings, and indicated a reluctance to rent to
12
families on public assistance . So although Mr. Burgess and
other POMP managers are successfully improving the housing
conditions of tenants in place, frequently with little or no
change in rent levels, the long term success of the buildings
hinges on the gradual turnover of apartments to people paying
higher rents. Whether these apartments will remain available to
the poor depends on the continued availability of rent subsidies,
and on the new owner's willingness to keep rents at a level
acceptable to the subsidy programs.
POMP buildings can, with HPD-funded repairs and good
management, produce an income, but no one will get rich from
them. Thus, only the good will of private managers will guarantee
POMP's success. Mr. Burgess, for example, has undertaken the
management of in rem buildings because he is excited by the
challenge. After years of managing upper income cooperatives in
another neighborhood he claims to be tired of meetings and intra-
cooperative politics. But he is a businessman and as such must
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look for ways to increase his profits. If the intuition that led
him to choose 145 Grand St. Extension is correct and the Southside
becomes a more attractive neighborhood, then in five years, when
rent and resale restrictions end, he will have the opportunity to
sell the buildings at a good profit to a landlord who may not have
his commitment to ensuring old tenants an affordable rent. If his
intuition is incorrect and the neighborhood deteriorates, he will
be faced with the same situation that caused the original owner to
abandon in the first place. In spite of his enthusiasm he will
probably be reluctant to provide the present high-quality
management if operating costs begin to exceed income.
While the short-term success of POMP has been convincing, for
these reasons the units it has produced probably won't constitute
a long-term low-income housing resource. Because the program is
new, there have been no follow-up studies done of buildings after
they are sold; since none of those buildings are past the five-
year period of HPD-monitored period of restricted sales, there is
no way of knowing how they will fare without government oversight.
Two conditions are necessary for these buildings to provide a more
than temporary resource: a landlord willing to forgo large, quick
profits, and a neighborhood where the housing market is stable.
Are these conditions more prevalent than the existence of groups
of tenants willing to work hard to preserve their housing? Policy
must be based on the assumption that people act out of their self-
interest. The provision of adequate housing for the poor may not
always be in the interest of the private realtors on which -POMP
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relies. It is, on the other hand, always in the interest of a
building's inhabitants to help themselves.
2. Critiguges f Self-Hel2 II
Other criticisms of self-help housing for low-income tenants
focus on both the political implications of this housing movement
and on its ability to produce housing. The first of these
concerns is that encouraging tenants to purchase their apartments
and undertake management discourages them from radical political
involvement, both by changing their position in the housing market
and by distracting them with managerial tasks. The second that a
self-help program without adequate support and funding, is a
merely convenient way for government to absolve itself of
responsibility to house the poor, is addressed in Chapter Six.
The first criticism addresses the concern that the latent
purpose of programs encouraging the poor to own their dwellings is
to trap them into having a financial stake in status quo society
and in this way mute their opposition to those in power. First,
the argument goes, ownership changes an inhabitant's relationship
to his or her living space, and thus to society. No longer
propertyless, the homeowner has something to protect, a reason not
to throw a brick through someone's window. Second, a homeowner
has a new set of responsibilities that may keep him or her away
from community activities. Critics argue that cooperative
ownership, while promoting contact between immediate neighbors,
forces tenant leaders to arrange the complex affairs of their
organization rather than use their energies to further broader
political struggles: ". . all too often, when workers erupted in
strikes, organizers collected dues cards; when tenants refused to
pay rent and stood off marshalls, organizers formed building
committees; when people were burning and looting, organizers used
13
that ':moment of madness' to draft constitutions" . Not only do
cooperative owners turn their energy toward the issues they
confront as homeowners, but they are often forced to turn it on
each other; elected leaders must exercise authority over others in
order to fulfill management obligations, to the extent of being
called upon to evict their neighbors.
In this view, tenant self-managers are accepting the rules of
the current "housing as a profitable commodity" system. They have
been handed property of their own to cultivate as they wish and
are busying themselves with that activity rather than addressing
the fact that the system is still unjust, that their adequate
housing is still considered not a right but a privilege, and that
they must earn the right to keep it by sacrificing their time and
money. Some radical housing analysts believe that self-help
programs divert pressure from society's powerful, hindering the
development of a mass movement advocating government's
responsibility to provide housing for all.
The day when our government acknowledges its obligation to
shelter all its citizens may be long in coming, and meanwhile poor
people have to live somewhere. The in rem housing program,
through a combination of public rental housing and tenant-managed
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cooperatives, offers several housing alternatives that can be
realized today. The question for those who both advocate self-
help housing and share the goal of a public commitment to housing
is whether the self-help aspects of the IRHP run counter to the
efforts to reaffirm public responsibility for the poor.
Those who fear the deradicalizing effects of a change in
tenure status are basing their fears on the rhetoric of the 235
program, which implied that homeownership opportunities would turn
the disenfranchised poor into upholders of American capitalist
values. But it is far more probable that
many disadvantaged households place a value on a
permanent homestead and the holding of property that has
little to do with more mainstream, market-oriented standards
of the goodness of investment(14).
Low-income minority purchasers of 235 housing, as well as
cooperative participants of similar ethnic and economic
characteristics, have been equally disinterested in becoming
society's stakeholders. They were not "pulled" toward the
attractive option of home ownership, as much as "pushed" out of
substandard rental housing. Participants repeatedly cited the
offensiveness of their previous living situations, and those of
others in their community, as reason to pursue either single-
family or cooperative ownership, without expressing any interest
in altering their social status or improving their finances. The
financial benefits of ownership such as tax deductions mean little
to people in low tax brackets, and many subsidized cooperatives
are structured so that little capital gain can be realized. In
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sum, "low-income renters indicating interest in owner-occupancy
are really expressing a desire for better neighborhoods and
improved housing quality, and not simply a fee interest in their
15
dwellings"
Interviews with DAMP participants provide little further
evidence of people "selling out" or abandoning their tenant
sensibilities. Those questioned mentioned affordability, good
services, and the power to maintain those benefits as the factors
16
that made their present situation preferable to renting . Even
residents of coops that were unsuccessful by objective standards
such as fiscal health and management performance still preferred
17
cooperative ownership for these reasons . Tenants in several
Southside buildings mentioned the dismal conditions in private
housing in the neighborhood as sufficient motivation for tenant
18
takeover ; a tenant in a TIL building in a gentrified
neighborhood felt that self-management was the only way she could
19
avoid being forced to move ; a tenant in a city-owned building
which has been mishandled by HPD and a local CBO and shunted
between city programs still stated unequivocally that she
preferred her current predicament to the exploitation of private
20
ownership . In Harlem,. residents of TIL buildings "could not
answer the question, 'What would you have done if there were no
21
TIL program?'" The statement of a member of a recently
purchased DAMP coop illustrates the continuing sense of struggle
among tenants turned owners: "We started several years ago as the
Desperation Tenants Association. Today, things have changed, and
22
we are the Desperation Cooperative".
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The claim that the responsibility of running a building
prevents tenants from engaging in other community activities is
not borne out by the evidence. Although many leaders
periodically feel overwhelmed by their responsibilities, they
emphasize the lessons of participating in a coop: "Working
23
together you can accomplish more than working alone " . "In the
24
worst situations you must fight to gain something positive"
Surely these sentiments would encourage participation in other
community struggles. Furthermore, the impact of participation on
individuals, especially women, has been profound. All leaders
interviewed felt they had gained personally from their
involvement. Aside from their pride in their ability to manage a
building., they have gained confidence in their organizational
skills and the value of their opinions. One tenant association
president spoke of the "satisfaction of being able to offer
something useful, even if the issue being discussed is not
25
directly related to your building"
By yirtue of the fact that many buildings are either
officially or informally associated with a local CBO, tenant
leaders may get involved in other community issues. The CBO in
the Southside is run by a Board on which every tenant-run building
in the neighborhood is entitled to have a representative. As a
result of this initial association., several tenant leaders have
become active Board members and community spokespeople on diverse
issues. In the Southside and in Harlem as well, according the the
study by Leavitt and Saegart, many of the men in tenant leadership
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roles had previously been involved in community or church
activities, but most of the women were drawn out of their homes
26
for the first time by tenant issues . Some women involved in
their tenant associations were thus exposed to community services
and inspired to study English, get their Equivalency Diplomas, or
participate in job training. Several who were previously on
public assistance are now employed.
Another challenge to the claim that self-help housing
depoliticizes its participants is the nature of cooperative
ownership. Critics would argue that cooperative housing is just
like single-family housing, except everyone has to chip in to pay
for the oil. While New York City coops are not experiments in
communal living along the lines of an Israeli kibbutz or Robert
Owens' utopias, they can be an alternative--even a challenge--to
the "dream house" ideal popularized and promoted in this country
27
by government policy and private market advertising . Such an
alternative becomes more important as the nuclear family for which
the traditional detached home was designed becomes less common.
Making cooperative ownership work in the fac'e of official
indifference and skepticism and appreciating its unique benefits
have opened the eyes of some DAMP participants to the possibility
of "redesigning the American dream."
As tenants in a building band together, either to challenge
their landlord, or in his absence, to run their building, the
nature of their relationship to each other is transformed. Skills
and services are informally exchanged; older residents, for
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example, provide childcare for the younger ones, who help them
read or translate important letters. Families without telephones
are connected to the outside world by those with them. Together
residents create recreation space, the scarcest urban commodity,
in basements and courtyards. In one building the tenants cleaned
out the garbage-filled basement, making one room into a brightly
colored meeting/party room; in another the superintendent set up
weights so he and his friends could hang out in their basement
while h@ kept An @y@ on the troublesome boiler. After a few
months of tenant organization in another building, one of the few
in this study that was equally split between white (primarily
elderly and Jewish) and Hispanic tenants, apartment doors were
left unlocked and children played in the hallways. Older
residents commented happily that it was "like the old days."
Certainly people don't need to own their building in order to
cooperate with their neighbors; some tenant-run buildings are
successful because they build on close relationships that
developed before the landlord walked away. But cooperative
ownership gives people a sense of control over their environment
that brings this contact beyond casual friendship and into
collective activity. As renters, they can't decide who moves in
next door or how often the halls get cleaned, or decide that the
basement would be a great place to have a Christmas party. As
owners, they can.
The pride of the tenants interviewed coupled with the
89
objective indicators of management success (e.g., low vacancy
rates and good rent collection) found in this and other studies.,
suggests that tenant self-management can save abandonned
buildings. Whether the HPD programs provide sufficient support
for these efforts will be addressed in the next chapter.
Notes on Chapter Five
1. Sullivan, Division of Alternative Management fggrams.
2. Schur, "Growing Lemons", 43.
3. Sullivan.
4. Ibid, 4-30.
5. Ibid, 4-13.
6. There are actually three tenant leasing programs: 7A Leasing
(in which a court-appointed administrator runs the building)
and Tenant Ownership Program, for buildings of one or two
units. TIL is by far the largest.
7. Cosme interview.
8. Kolodny, Self-Helg in the Inner City 177.
9. Alter interview.
10. Sullivan, 8-20.
11. Burgess interview.
12. Sullivan., 8-13.
13. Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward, Pgor Peoles
Movements (New York: Vintage Books, .1977).,xiii.
14. Victor Bach, "A Chance to Own," Ph.D. Dissertation, M.I.T.
Department of Urban Studies and Planning, (1977),256.
15. Stegman, Housing Ineystment., 195.
16. Sullivan.
90
17. Lawson.
18. Melendez interview.
19. Cabrera interview.
20. Cosme interview.
21. Jacqueline Leavitt and Susan Saegert, " Women and Abandoned
Buildings: A Feminist Approach to Housing," Social Policy 15,
(Summer 1984) 35.
22. Speech given by tenant association member at City Hall
reception marking the sale of the 10.,000th DAMP unit,
February 6, 1985.
23. Cabrera interview.
24. Cosme interview.
25. Melendez interview.
26. Leavitt and Saegert, 37.
27. Dolores Hayden, Redesigning the American Dream (New York: WW
Norton & Co. 1984).
91
CHAPTER SIX: DAMP'S EFFECTIVENESS IN
CREATING TENANT COOPERATIVES
Given the. conclusion that the self-help model represents a
good blueprint for preservation of low-income housing, encouraging
personal development and community involvement as well as
providing alternatives to the depressed rental market, in the next
section I will look at whether the specific DAMP programs, as
currently structured, encourage the long-term stability of the
coops. Whether all the benefits described in the preceding
section will mean a thing depends on whether the cooperatives
created in this program are financially and organizationally
viable. If, as some critics charge, the city is merely practicing
its own brand of lemon socialism, dumping hopeless. properties on
optionless tenants, then self-help is no more than fancy rhetoric
for allowing the poor to fend for themselves.
Interviews and with tenant, city officials and community
organization staff point to three areas of weakness in HPD's
approach to self-help which, if not addressed, seriously
jeopardize the long-term success of the program. The first is the
perceived lack of alternatives for tenants in city-owned
buildings; the second is the general confusion about sales
policy--both the pressure put on tenant groups by HPD staff to
purchase and the policy of treating buildings in strong market
areas differently than the others; and the third is the chronic
underfunding of the cooperatives, which often are sold with
serious pysical defects and increasingly without assurances of
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rental subsidies.
A. Lack of Alternatives
Not everyone wants to live in a cooperative. In upper income
cooperatives maintenance payments are usually adequate to cover
the services of a building manager,, and are certainly high enough
to ensure adequate upkeep. Because upper income cooperative
dwellers can occupy their apartments almost as though they were
renters, while enjoying ownership benefits of equity accumulation
and tax deductions, coop apartments have become very popular in
New York City. In spite of these advantages there are many who
still choose to rent, objecting to the meetings and rules and to
the sense that how you live and with whom is someone else's
business. Furthermore ownership brings with it additional
expenses. Monthly carrying charges don't cover repairs inside
individual apartments, and building-wide emergencies sometimes
require special assessments.
While one may personally prefer to rent, if faced with.the
choice of joining a cooperative or risking substandard housing at
uncertain rents one would certainly choose the former. This is
the situation of most tenants in city-owned buildings. They must
either agree to an alternative management program, the result of
which is cooperative ownership, or opt for Central Management.
While improvements in HPD's management standards has been noted,
performance is still too uneven and the future too uncertain for
any tenant group to feel that chosing to remain a rental will not
be regretted shortly. The city's ambivalence about the existence
of a permanent rental stock., manifested in its failure to
promulgate clear policies about rent levels or commit itself to
rehabilitation standards, has the effect of driving tenants to the
alternatives.
Why should this be a problem? After all, one of the points
of this thesis is that the self-help model should be available to
as many tenant groups as possible. However, the model's
desirability is predicated on the assumption that tenants are
participating voluntarily. As long as there are no options there
will be those in DAMP buildings who would rather be in a different
housing situation. These non-enthusiasts range from those who pay
their rent but resent any further involvement, to problem tenants
who don't pay rent, don't keep up their apartments, and force
tenant leaders to use expensive, time-consuming legal means to
evict them. In some cases tenant associations, wary of their
future under Central Management, agree to alternative management
evem though they lack solid support from the majority of tenants.
(TIL requires that 75% of all tenants sign an agreement to enter
the program, but experience shows that people will sign without
understanding the implications and later refuse to cooperate.)
When they are unable to run their building, leaders feel they
have failed.
Tenant groups should choose alternative management because
the concept of control and eventual ownership appeals to them, not
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because it's their only way of assuring adequate services and a
secure future. Furthermore, individual tenants in buildings
opting for self-management who don't wish to participate in a
cooperative should have the option of being relocated to another
city-owned building nearby. Perhaps HPD and a local CBO could
work out some kind of exchange, whereby a household in a building
entering DAMP could be offered a suitable apartment elsewhere.
Similarly, a tenant in a Central Management building who wants the
opportunity to live in a coop by can't interest her or his
neighbors in the idea could be referred to local DAMP buildings.
Since it is important that DAMP tenant associations retain
ultimate control over tenant selection it would not be possible to
assure such a tenant a DAMP apartment, but such a system could be
useful to DAMP buildings looking for prospective coop
participants.
B. Sales Policy
Another shortcoming of current HPD tenant-management programs
is their vague and arbitrary sales policy. Sales, or "outtake,"
has been the most contentious DAMP issue since the division was
created. Some tenant groups complain of being pressured to
purchase their buildings before they are ready., others waiting to
purchase are unclear about the cause of delay. Much of this
confusion stems from the lack of consensus among city officials
about what should be accomplished during the interim period of
tenant or community managment, traceable to further lack of
consensus about DAMP's purpose. During its first year., three DAMP
goals were articulated: one, to provide decent housing to tenants
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of in rem buildings; two, to train organizations to manage and
thereby test their ability to eventually own in rem buildings; and
three, "to ultimately convey title of the properties, stabilized
and upgraded through a period of responsible management, to
1
private groups"
Early statements also emphasized the subordination of sales
goals to the larger aims of neighborhood stabilization:
The success of the In Rem Housing Program will be marked not
by short term revenue gain at the expense of future
deterioration of the existing stock. Rather, the Program
will have achieved its goal if neighborhoods where there are
presently large numbers of City-owned properties have been
strengthened and if buildings once sold remain on the tax
rolls and do not return to City ownership several years
after sale(2).
By 1981 program participants noted a new emphasis on sales
and less concern on an appropriate stabilization period.
Forgetting the initial DAMP goals of providing decent housing
while training new managers, the Fourth Annual In Rem Housing
Report stated, "The true test of the success of DAMP programs
would be whether they could achieve volume rehabilitation and
sales"
Ideally, for a coop to be successful in the long run, several
things must occur before the tenants purchase their building.
While some enter city ownership with sophisticated tenant
organizations and secure finances, most require an incubation
period to achieve these ends. A tenant association must be
developed; its members must learn how to manage a building; they
must reach a consensus on organization by-laws and learn enough
96
about the legal principles of cooperative ownership to make
decisions about their future. Meanwhile, the renovation work
agreed to by HPD must be completed. A continual complaint of
tenant leaders is that HPD's pressure to purchase begins whether
or not these processes have been completed. A 1982 study
confirmed these impressions, finding that a building's position in
the sales "pipeline" was correlated only with its length of time
in the program, and not with buiding conditions or management
4
ability
The development of a cohesive sales policy has been further
hindered by the Koch administration's fear that tenant cooperators
in gentrifying neighborhoods will resell their apartments at great
profit. Concern centered around the Chelsea-Clinton area,
situated on Manhattan's West Side between 14th and 59th Streets.
Here, the real estate boom that has affected all of Manhattan,
plus the development of a the new Jacob Javits Convention Center
and proposed commercial development for Times Square, have turned
what had been New York's toughest neighborhood, previously known
as Hell's Kitchen, into an area of $1,000 a month rentals and
$100,000 coops. Ten years ago the old housing stock of this area
had been considered undesirable, so much of it had ended up in the
City's hands. By 1982, as the real estate market was
strengthening, some dozen buildings were completing Community
Management and Tenant Interim Lease and preparing for sales. At
this time HPD informed the tenants in these buildings that they
would have to purchase their apartments at a "fair market rate".,
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which would certainly be beyond the means of most of them.
An unprecendented city-wide mobilization of alternative
management tenants, all of whom felt their future threatened if
the Clinton-Chelsea tenants were displaced, succeeded in restoring
the $250 per unit sales price. However, this was gained in
exchange for resale restrictions that require a portion of any
profits earned by sale of shares to revert to the city. The
efforts to work out the details of this cumbersome plan (see
Appendix 3) have held up sales on a number of buildings.
C. Financial Viability
The last and most critical test of the DAMP program is
whether it provides the financial resources needed to ensure the
long term viablity of its cooperatives. DAMP sales are too recent
for there to have been any longitudinal studies at this point, but
pre-sale financial data and follow-up studies on cooperatives
developed under other programs suggest that many DAMP coops could
be head for trouble. In this section I will examine the financial
stability of projects under TIL and CMP and discuss the
implications of insufficient funding for future alternative
management efforts.
In 1982, Pratt Institute surveyed twelve Community Management
and eleven Tenant Interim Lease buildings to determine, among
other things, their financial viability. They found that to bring
buildings up to acceptable standards in the Community Management
Program, in which up to $ 2 0 , 0 0 0 per dwelling unit may be spent for
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rehabilitation, a combination of program funds and after sales
low-interest loans was sufficient. On average, each building
required a $9,418 per apartment investment, with the bulk of this
amount going toward building-wide systems repairs. The two survey
buildings located in the Southside were at the high end of the
range: 227 South 2nd Street required $12,070 per dwelling unit
($9848 for systems repairs and $2222 for cosmetic apartment
repairs); and 263 South 2nd Street needed $11,938, with $7642 for
5
systems and $3756 for apartments
In TIL buildings, where the maximum investment in 1982 was
$1500 per dwelling unit (since raised to $2,000 to $3,000) the
situation was very different. Ten of the eleven buildings in the
study required repair work beyond the scope of the program. The
average investment needed came to $9211 per dwelling unit, with
$5355 needed for systems repairs. This left a gap of some $8,000
per apartment between the needs of the building and the provisions
of the program. The study concluded that
Any projections for successful long-term disposition of TIL
buildings to their tenants must be based on the rather
tenuous assumption that this mismatch will be
overcome....The failure of the TIL program to succeed by
this critical measure undermines completely whatever success
it achieves by the other...criteria(6).
On the whole the Pratt analysts were satisfied that monthly
carrying costs were within the rent-paying range of the in rem
tenant population. CMP buildings required post-purchase rents in
the $35-50 per room range. The two Southside buildings in the
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sample were at the high end of this range: 227 South 2nd Street
was $40 a room, or $208 a month, and 263 South 2nd Street was $55
a room, or $273 a month for a two-bedroom apartment. These rents
were affordable to families earning $8,303 or $10,928
respectively, assuming a family could pay a rent equivalent to 30%
of its income. TIL rents fell into the same range; the TIL
building located in the Southside that was studied was projected
to require rents of nearly $50 a room, or $252 for a two-bedroom
apartment, affordable (assuming a 30". rent/income ratio) to a
7
family earning $10,098
Pratt's concludsion that the rents needed to support these
buildings are affordable to most in rem tenants is premised on two
questionable assumptions. First, it assumes that a family can
comfortably pay 30% of its gross income for rent. This is the
figure used by the federal government, but in fact it is high for
B
a family with children , especially since monthly rentals do not
include electricity and cooking gas, which could add $25 to $45 to
a family's monthly budget. Second, projected rents are based on
the assumption that the renovations needed to repair faulty
systems in TIL buildings will somehow be made. If they are not
operating expenses for these buildings are likely to be higher.
If they borrow to make repairs, they will have to add their
monthly debt service to their expenses. If they don't make the
repairs, their operating expenses will reflect the fact that they
will be making constant emergency repairs.
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I have therefore reviewed the monthly financial statements of
several TIL buildings in the Southside under different
assumptions. The two presented here are fairly typical--one is in
good condition, the other in fair condition. Both entered the TIL
program in August, 1982 after of period of unofficial tenant
management, and both are expected to be sold to the tenants within
the coming year. I have calculated the income needed to support
various rent levels assuming that a family can pay somewhere in
the range of 25% to 30% of its gross income for rent. For each
building I have given three sets of projections. The first
assumes that the building is sold to the tenants as it is today.
The second assumes that HPD makes all needed repairs before sale:
all mechanical systems are in good enough working order so that
they will function without major breakdown for another fifteen
years; the building envelope is weathertight; and each apartment
has a working stove and refrigerator. In the third set of
projections HPD makes no repairs and the tenant -association
borrows money from a low-interest revolving fund to replace two
systems. In both cases I have assumed that the rent collection
rates will remain constant; projected rents are high endugh to
compensate for income lost to rent arrears. In neither case have
I considered the possibility of HPD undertaking non-system
repairs, except for appliance replacement; first, because the
costs are too hard to extimate without a thorough building
inspection,, and second, because that is the kind of work tenants
are most capable of accomplishing themselves.
Unfortunately it is hard to evaluate the potential fiancial
1 C) 1
succes of a building from these income and expense statements. It
would appear, for instance, that a tenant association that had
high monthly expenses could anticipate more financial problems
than one that didn't spend so much, when in fact the former may be
more diligent in making repairs. I have therefore combined the
information from monthly expense and income statements with
information from tenant interviews to get a sense of what kinds of
expenses would be incurred over the course of a year. I have
included the additional projected expenses associated with
ownership.
195 South Fourth Street (see Table 6.1)
This is a 35-unit building with no commercial units. All
apartments have either 3.5 or 4.5 rooms. It has had some rent
collection problems, mostly due to one or two delinquent families.
The tenant association pays 7% of the rent roll (around $300 a
month) to one of its members, who performs management functions.
New windows and a recapped roof are the only major improvements
undertaken over the past few years. All other systems- are faulty,
and the boiler has been a constant source of anxiety and expense;
originally designed to heat two buildings, it is ancient,
oversized, and inefficient.
102
Table 6.1
195 South Fourth Street
Monthly Income and Expenses
(based on reports for November and December,
1984 and January, 1985)
Income
Rents Billed
Rent Collected
$5300
4660 (87.9")
EX~e sesm
Fixed Costs:
Super's Salary
Manager's Fee
Liability Insurance
Debt Servic-e
Subtotal
Variable Costs:
Oil
Electrical
Repairs
Supplies
Subtotal
Service
TOTAL
2400***
115****
600
200
3990
*Not actually paid this quarter
**On no-interest loan taken from local fund to make boiler
repairs.
***Adjusted to reflect winter months.
****Covers electricity for common areas (halls, basement and
boiler)
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$150
300
90*
135**
675
In Projection 1 (see Table 6.2), in which no repairs are
made, 195 South Fourth Street is very expensive to operate.
Plumbing repairs., boiler maintenance and fuel make up the bulk of
the monthly expenses. To make ends meet the tenants would have to
pay $68.00 a room or $240 for the 3.5 room apartments and $306 for
the 4.5 room apartments. Assuming a family pays somewhere between
25% and 30% of its income for rent, these apartments would require
incomes of $8655 to $11,520 and $11,016 to $14,688, respectively.
Since tenants in this building probably have incomes somewhere
between the $6500 median for the Southside and $8000 median for
all in rem tenants in the city, most of them would require rent
subsidies to pay this rent.
Projection 2 assumes that HPD has repaired all systems before
selling the building. At 195 South Fourth Street that would
require an approximately $7000 per unit investment. As a result
the building would need a smaller reserve fund., and operating
expenses are lower. In this case, minimal rent increases would be
required.
Projection 3 assume that the tenants have borrowed $90,000 to
repair their plumbing system and replace their boiler. With a
debt service obligation of $622 a month, they must raise their
rents to $52 a room: $182 for a 3.5 room apartment and $234 for a
4.5 room apartment. Some tenants would require rent susbsidies.
A large reserve fund would be needed to cover emergency repairs to
those systems not covered by the loan money.
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Table 6.2
195 South Fourth Street
Projected Monthly Expenses and-Required Rents After Sale
Ec::2d.L 1 PriA2 P r
Fixed Costs:
Fire&Liability
Corporate Taxes
Prop. Taxes
Salaries
Debt Service
Variable Costs:
Plumbing
Electrical
Plaotering
Painting
Appliances
Extermin.
Boiler
Elect. Serv.
Fuel
Misc.Supplies
Misc.Repairs
Reserve
TOTAL
Required Rent
per room
$ 416.60
75.00
625.00
450.00
135.00
1500.00
350.00
350.00
80.00
400.00
75.00
200.00
115.00
2400.00
150.00
200.00
700.00
6520.00
68.00
3.5 Rm Apt 240.00
Required Income 8655-11,520
4.5 Rm Apt 306.00
Required Income 11,016-14,688
150.00
5365-7200
190.00
6885-9120
182.00
6552-8736
234.--
8424-11,232
*Projection 1--Building sold as is.
**Projection 2--HPD does all needed repairs
***Projection 3--Tenants borrow $90,000 at 3%, 15-year pay-back.
(See Appendix
calculated.)
4 for an explanation of how figures
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416.60
75.00
625.00
450.00
135.00
350.00
150.00
75.00
80.00
200.00
75.00
100. 00
115.00
1700.00
150.00
100.00
300.00
5096.60
42.50
416.60
75.00
625.00
450.00
757.00
350.00
350.00
100.00
80.00
400.00
75.00
100. 00
115.00
1900.00
150.00
150.00
700.00
4470.00
52.00
were
167 Havemeyer Street (see Table 6.3)
This building has twenty apartments, each with 4.5 or 5.5
rooms, and four stores. The rents paid by the stores, while
modeset compared to other commercial rents in the neighborhood,
allow the tenants to keep their own rents low. The rent
collection at Havemeyer Street has always been excellent. They
pay no management fee. They have made a number of improvements in
their building; only their plumbing and electrical systems pose
problems.
Under Projection 1, the tenants would have to raise the
commercial rents by 20. and their own rents to $54 a room. Thus a
4.5 room apartment would rent for $245 (requiring imcomes of $8820
to $11,760); a 5.5 room apartment for $297 (requiring incomes of
$10.,692 to $14,256). Many of the tenants would need rent
subsidies to pay these amounts. Under the other two projections,
however, 167 Havemeyer Street could cover its costs by increasing
commercial rents (see Table 6.4).
These analyses give us only a partial sense of the potential
viability of these cooperatives. Clearly both would have
difficulties if they had to buy their buildings without any
repairs. 167 Havemeyer, thanks to its commercial rents and good
physical condition, could manage with only access to a low-
interest loan and no HPD-funded repairs. 195 South Fourth Street
would require at least some combination of city-sponsored repairs
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Table 6.3
167 Havemeyer Street
Monthly Income and Expenses
(based on reports from November and December,
1984 and January, 1985)
Income
Rents billed
Commercial
Residential
$4409
1150
3259
Rents collected
Fixed Costs
Super's Salary
Liability Insurance
Variable Costs
Fuel (gas)
Electrical Service
Repairs
Supplies
TOTAL
4075 (92.5%)
74.00
84.00
1340. 00*
60.00
1533.00
579.00
4210.00
*Adjusted to reflect winter months.
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Table 6.4
167 Havemeyer Street
Projected Monthly Expenses and Required Rents After Sale
Ecgd..L 1 ..-Io .3
Fixed Costs:
Fire&Liability
Corporate Tax es
Prop. Taxes
Salaries
Debt Service
Variable Costs:
Plumbing
Electrical
Plastering
Painting
Appliances
Extermin.
Boiler
Elect. Serv.
Fuel
Misc. Supplies
Misc.Repairs
Reserve
TOTAL
$500.30
60. 00
833.00
74.00
-- O--
1500.00
200.00
200.00
50.00
229.00
75.00
50.00
60.00
1340.00
150.00
200.00
500.00
60210.30
500.30
60.00
833. 00
74. 00
-- 0--
200. 00
100.00
50.00
50. 00
116.00
75.00
50.00
60.00
1340.00
150 . OO0
100.00
300.00
4058.30
500. 30
60. O0
833. 00
74.00
691.00
200. 00
100.00
50.00
50.00
116. 00
75.00
50.00
60. 00
1340.00
150. 00
100.00
300.00
4749. 30
Required Rent
per room
Commercial rent
increase
4.5 Rm Apt 245.00
Required Income 8820-11,760
5.5 Rm Apt 297.00
Required Income 10,692-14,256
157.50
5670-7560
192.50
6930-9240
157.50
5670-7560
1?2. 50
6930-9240
*Projection 1--Building sold as is.
**Projection 2--HPD does all needed repairs
***Projection 3--Tenants borrow $100,000 at 3X, 1
(See Appendix 4 for an explanation of how
calculated.)
5-year pay-back.
f i gures were
108
54.00
20%X
35.00
10%
35.00
20X
and access to loan money to survive in the long run. Of course,
neither of these buildings has the resources to survive a major
emergency. Since tenant cooperatives in slum neighborhoods are
not likely to get conventional bank loans, it is important that
the low-interest loans provided by HPD be available for
emergencies. One problem with relying on these funds for systems
repairs before sales is that once a tenant association has taken
out a loan it will be hard-pressed to find funds to deal with an
emergency.
Whether and how cooperatives will be able to cope with future
financial pressures is of concern to their participants. The
previously cited follow-up of the projects studied in 1973 showed
that all but 26. of the 46 cooperatives had very serious tax and
9
debt service arrears . Since DAMP cooperatives are not eligible
for tax abatements and are frequently borrowing to make repairs
that HPD will not do, there is the possibility that they will
experience the same difficulties as their predecessors. 104
Division Avenue, a cooperative in the Southside that had gone
through the TIL program and been purchased in 1982, is now
confronted with the breakdown of the systems not repaired by HPD.
The tenants must raise their rents in order to borrow money. They
are also considering the possibility of increasing the price of
the units, and raising capital when people by into the
10
cooperative . Low-income housing advocates fear that many
cooperatives may turn to this method of raising money, thus
discouraging other poor families from joining. Several other
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Southside cooperatives had been produced through the Community
Management Program, and received considerably more substantial
rehabilitation. A few years after sale these buildings are still
in good physical condition and therefore free of financial
pressures. Some of them, however, are experiencing organizational
and management problems, perhaps traceable to CMP's failure to
train tenant associations adequately.
It is the spectre of financial failure that cause low-income
housing advocates the most concern about the future of self-help
management of in rem properties in New York City. They are
worried that without proper funding these programs are doomed from
the start, while desperate tenants run in circles trying to make
them work. Images of tenants set adrift in leaky lifeboats, or
"cooperative ownership as 'judas-goat' . . . leading the proverbial
11
lambs to slaughter" are evoked. The harshest critics claim
that the program is merely an acceptable way for the government to
ignore its responsibility to provide housing for the poor. Low-
income tenants respond to the promise of control and security, but
without sufficient funds it turns out to be illusory.
The lesson of the stories related above is that tenant
management can work, and when it does it can produce benefits such
as increased community involvement as well as improved housing.
But the success of tenant-managed buildings depends on a delicate
balance of financial support, technical assistance, and resident
cooperation. In several crucial ways, HPD programs fail to ensure
the confluence of these factors. By encouraging tenant control in
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landlord-abanondoned buildings., the City of New York has the
opportunity to create a network of permanent, comfortable,
affordable homes using minimal subsidies., thereby turning
buildings that would otherwise drain municipal resources into tax
paying sources of pride. HPD's efforts should be directed toward
doing whatever is necessary to make these projects work,
especially since their failure only results in greater management
burdens for the city.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: ASSISTED TENANT LEASING:
A PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE MANAGEMENT MODEL
Both Community Management and Tenant Interim Leasing., two
programs designed to create tenant cooperatives., have important
strengths, but both have flaws that call into question their
ability to develop viable housing while fostering community
development. CMP provides jobs, renovates apartments, facilitates
a relationship between tenant groups and knowledgeable community
organizations, and offers CBO the opportunity to extend their
influence in their communities. It does not, however, adequately
prepare tenants for the task of running their building, and it
compromises CBOs by making them middlemen between HPD and tenants.
TIL, on the other hand, gives tenants the opportunity for self-
management, but leaves them with insufficient technical and
financial support. Moreover, there is an inequity in these two
programs, whereby the buildings in Community Management can
receive up to $20,000 of renovation funds per unit, whereas TIL
buildings receive much less. While tenants in CMP buildings are
arguing about the color of their new bathroom tiles, TIL tenants
are making do with inadequate plumbing.
A. ProCam Dsign
I am proposing Assisted Tenant Leasing as an alternative to
replace both Community Management and TIL. The structure of ATL
would be very much like that of TIL. A tenant association would
sign a lease with HPD, accepting management responsibility for its
building and agreeing to eventual purchase at $250 an apartment.
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HPD would contract with CBOs to perform services in support of ATL
buildings in their catchment area. There is already a precedent
for this sort of arrangement: Currently, HPD contracts with CBOs
through its Community Consultant program. Recognizing that its
programs are only as good as their ability to reach those who need
them, and that CBOs already have communication networks in their
services areas, HPD pays groups to promote city programs and
generally act as a liaison between community residents and city
bureaucracy. Community Consultant Contracts, funded by federal CD
dollars, are usually sufficient to cover the cost of one or two
staff people.
As part of the ATL program, HPD would either expand the
current Community Consultant program so that groups in areas with
extensive city-owned stock could devote one or two staff people
exclusively to working with tenant-run buildings, or set up a
parallel program to achieve the same purpose. The contract would
provide funds for staff and for overhead costs incurred by ATL
buildings and coops. For instance, there might be money for a
typewriter or other office equipment that would be available for
tenant" association officials to use, and funds to reimburse the
CBO for use of its photocopying machines and telephones. Tenant-
run buildings might also be able to use the CBO's facilities for
meetings. Since new tenant associations are often unfamiliar with
organizational procedures, CBO staff could be available to attend
their meetings, help them determine agendas and set up by-laws.
CBO staff can also be indispensable in acquainting tenant leaders
with government programs that can benefit their building, and
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arr-anging bulk purchasing and credit. If buildings require
technical services of engineers, architects or lawyers CBO staff
could arrange to hire the professional with the various coops
splitting the fee. And CBO staff would be available to provide
training whenever there is turnover of leadership.
One of the benefits of CMP is its provision of a trained
maintenance staff performing day-to-day repairs, ordering
materials, and at times undertaking major rehabilitation. This is
a benefit that extends beyond its immediate function, since it
also provides employment for a dozen or so community residents.
Frequently CMP maintenance staff will be hired by TIL tenant
associations to work in their buildings after regular work hours;
this provides additional income for the staff and access to
skilled local workers for tenant-run buildings. However, an on-
site maintenance staff is one of CMP's largest expenses.
One of the goals of ATL would be to enable CBOs to maintain a
repair staff that was more or less self-sufficient. To begin,
HPD's contract with a CBO could include some provision for a
maintenance staff--perhaps overhead costs and a maintenance
supervisor's salary. Tenant associations, whether participants in
ATL or already cooperative owners, could hire the CBO's
maintenance company for repairs, paying them for their services as
they would pay a private contractor. The maintenance company
could even bid on large renovation jobs; if effective it would
most likely start getting requests from private landlords as well.
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The goal would be for the maintenance company to become a for-
profit subsidiary of the CBO; if it ever actually made a profit
the money could be used to fund other CBO activities.
Ideally, buildings would be able to support themselves from
their rent roll while in city ownership. TIL buildings are already
self-supporting. In Community Management, a CBO receives an
operating subsidy to cover all the buildings in its contract; a
tenant association therefore buys its buildings without any idea
of what it actually costs to run it. It is important for tenants
to have the experience of operating their building on its rent
roll before adding the additional burden of taxes and insurance.
Rent subsidies, currently available to tenants only after the
building is purchased, should be extended into the pre-sales
period as well.
HPD should agree to sell buildings with all major systems
(electrical, heating, plumbing) working well and the building
envelope secure. Tenants could be responsible for internal
repairs sUch as replacing appliances, painting, and plasteri.ng.
Tenant associations could decide for themselves whether they want
to borrow money to attend to these matters, or leave them up to
individual cooperators. For some buildings, a $ 2 , 0 0 0 per unit
investment by HPD might be sufficient, for others it might be
$15,000 per unit--HPD should be flexible about the amount
permitted for these system repairs. (See Chapter Eight for average
per unit cost estimates.) While ATL might result in unequal
amounts -of money being allocated to different buildings, the
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inequality would be based on documented need rather than the
coincidence of having landed in one program or another. Low-
interest loans should remain available for emergencies, and tax
abatements should be offered as well. Such abatements could take
the form of a gradual phase-in of property tax payments. This
represents a smaller commitment to rehabilitation than is
currently available under Community Management. Ideally,, of
course, every building would receive a complete moderate
rehabilitation as in Community Mangement. However, given the
dearth of funds, it is preferable to attend to the structural
soundness of many buildings than to completely renovate some while
others have major system deficiencies.
B. Sales Policy
ATL's goal would be to enable tenants to complete the program
in two to three years. This time period must remain flexible, to
allow for delays in repair work and the development of tenant
management skills. Periodic meetings should be held with tenant
association officials, CBO staff and HPD personnel to discuss the
a timetable for repairs, rent increases, and management
development. HPD and CBO coordinators could arrange appropriate
training to address tenant association weaknesses.
Resale restrictions should be designed to ensure the
continued availability of these units to low-income families. The
law under which these coops are formed (see Appendix 3 for
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details), which forbids the sale of units to families whose
combined income exceeds six times the rent, is sufficient to do
this, but enforcement mechanisms must be created.
The terms of resale restrictions are difficult, because they must
balance the public's interest in maintaining affordable housing
with the coop owner's right to earn a return on his or her
investment. After all, while "you've limited the profits on these
1
buildings, . . . you've done nothing to limit the risks" . The
current HPD policy in "hot" neighborhoods--demanding a percent of
profits for itself--seems like the worst possible solution.
Sellers will be tempted to charge more for their shares in order
to earn their expected rate of return after paying off the city.
Given the low turnover in DAMP coops and the few buildings
situated in profit-making areas, HPD is unlikely to earn enough
from this "tax" to pay the salary of the person hired to collect
it. Far more effective would be a system in which tenants were
eligible for a predetermined modest rate of return on investment.
C. Program Rationale
CMP and TIL represent two models of interaction between
tenant groups and neighborhood institutions. The former creates
such a dependent relationship that it stifles the development of
the cooperative and diverts the CBO from its advocacy role. The
latter is so ill-defined that TIL buildings may be struggling on
their own in areas where the expertise of other coop leaders and
CBO staff could be helpful. Once coops in either program are
sold, there are few places they can turn to for support. TIL
buildings and purchased coops must purchase fuel and materials,
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contract for repair services., and perform clerical functions.
They must develop mechanisms for training new leaders. For each
building to establish its own credit or buy its own typewriter and
xerox, machine is counterproductive. There are many ways that time
and money can be saved by inter-building cooperation. Why not use
the CBOs as a basis for this cooperation?
First and foremost, Assisted Tenant Leasing is a means of
maintaining low-cost, standard housing. Second, it provides the
mix of autonomy and support to each tenant group that it needs to
best develop its organization., and continues that support even
after sale. Thirdly, by working through established community
organizations it contributes to their organizational development,
and even provides a means of generating additional revenues and
creating jobs.
Notes on Chapter Seven
1. Bernard Cohen, "City-Owned Buildings: A Hard Sell," City
Limits 5 (February 1980), 8.
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'Part III
CHAPTER EIGHT: FUNDING THE IN REM HOUSING PROGRAM
Proposals . to improve the IRHP, both the alternative
management programs and Central Management, all revolve around the
need to find more money to invest in city-owned buildings. At
present, the entire DAMP budget and half the Division of Property
Management budget come out of federal Community Development funds
(see Table 8.1). Use of CD funds to support in rem housing was a
source of conflict between the City of New York and HUD when the
IRHP began in 1978, because CD funds were supposed to be for the
renovation, not the operation of low-income housing. The conflict
was resolved when HPD agreed to use city tax revenues to pay for
Central Management's operating costs, applying CD funds to Central
Management buildings only for repairs (see Table 8.2). These days
there is little conflict with HUD about use of the funds, but
constant worry that they will be cut. Since 1980, the city's
total CD allocation has fallen from $260 million to $213 million.
At present it seems unlikely that this amount will be cut further,
but even more unlikely that it will be increased. Since most of
the city's housing programs depend on CD money, plans for an
improved IRHP must be based on the assumption that the share of
the CD budget devoted to in rem housing cannot be increased.
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TABLE 8.1 Division of Alternative Management Programs
Fiscal Year 1964 Budget
(in millions)
Community Management Program
Tenant Interim Leasing
Private Ownership & Management
Homesteading
After Sales Support (BA Loans)
Technical Assistance and
Professional Services
Personnel and OTPS
Total
Source: conversation
DAMP Budget Director.
with Eileen White,
TABLE 8.2 Division of Proggerty Management
Fiscal Year 1984 Funding Sources
(in millions)
Community Development Funds
Tax Levy Funds
Rent Collections
$44.8
41.8
28.8
Source: Harry DiRienzo and Joan Allen,
The New York City In Rem Housing Program
$19.705
5.3
3.495
.842
.3
.75
3.0
33.392
A. How Much for In Rem Housing?
This section calculates a budget for the In
Program consistent with the goal articulated in
section: the accomplishment of systems renovations
all in rem buildings. Based on conversations with
managers., I have estimated the following repair
thirty-unit building:
Rem Housing
the previous
as needed for
real estate
costs for a
Replacement of plumbing $50,000
Replacement of electrical wiring 50,000
Replacement of boiler 30,000
Recap roof 10,o00
Replacement of apt. doors 7,500
Purchase new stove and refrigerator 21,000
Replacement of windows 50,000
Total 218,500
($7,283 per unit)
While this estimate omits any structural or cosmetic repairs.,
which in some buildings admittedly are sorely needed, it does
include money for windows, which is currently provided out of the
state weatherization budget. If window replacement continues to
be supported with state funds then the $50,000 included in this
budget can be devoted to other repairs. The $7283 per unit cost
should be thought of as an average, since some buildings will
require more and others less. Of the two buildings reviewed in
the previous chapter, for example, 167 Havemeyer Street needed few
major repairs, whereas 195 South 4th Street needed everything but
a new roof.
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At the end of FY 1983 there were 11,958 DAMP buildings, of
which 10,469 were in TIL and CMP. The number of units gained in
additional title vestings have been about equal to the number
sold, so this figure is about the same one year later. If these
10,469 units were to be treated as prescribed by the Assisted
Tenant Leasing program each would receive the proposed $7283 per
unit expenditure, for a total program outlay of $76.47 million.
If repairs are accomplished over a two-year period, the program's
yearly cost would be $38.235 million (see Table 8.3). $2 million
is added to the technical assistance line to fund community groups
working with the Assisted Tenant Leasing buildings; this would
provide fifty groups with $40,000 each to hire staff and pay
overhead costs. Each group would then have an average workload of
ten buildings. In the projected budget other programs are
increased only slightly. The total projected DAMP budget in Table
8.3 is $16 million higher than the present budget shown in Table
8.1; while additional funds have been allocated in the projected
budget, money has also been saved by equalizing the rehabilitation
levels in all buildings.
Projecting a new budget for Central Management buildings is
trickier, since HPD's figures don't make clear how much of their
budget goes for operating expenses, how must for repairs, and how
much for personnel. For the sake of this calculation I will
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TABLE 8..3 Progosed DAMP Budget
(in millions)
Assisted Tenant Leasing
Private Ownership & Management
Homesteadi ng
After Sales Support
Technical Assistance and
Professional Services
Personnel and OTPS
Total
$38.236
4.0
1. 0
.5
2.75
3.0
49.486
33.392
16.094
CD funds
Other sources
TABLE 8.4 Progosed Budget for
the Division of Pro2eCty Maagement
(in millions)
Repairs $77.685
44.8
32.89
Operating 41.8
28.8
13.0
CD Funds
Other sources
Rent Collections
Other sources
Total Amount Required from Other Sources: 61.98
Total Amount
(See Table 4.2)
Already Allocated from Other Sources:
Balance: 20.18
ignore HPD's personnel costs, and assume that the part of the
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41.8
budget funded through tax levies is the operating allocation,
while the part funded by CD money represents repairs (see Table
8.4). A $41.8 million annual operating budget for approximately
32,000 units represents as $1306 per unit cost. Rents collected
from Central Management buildngs cover $28.8 million, or $900 per
dwelling unit, leaving a balance of $406 required to cover each
apartment's operating costs, or $13 million in total.
If repair funds were to be budgeted at $7283 an apartment,
then $233 million would be required for all units. Projecting a
repair schedule spread out over three years., this would cost
$77.68 million a year, or $2428 a unit each year. $44.8 million
of this is CD-funded, leaving $32.885 million for other funding
sources. Combined with the operating shortfall, the total program
cost not covered by rents or CD money would be $45.89 million.
The total city contribution for in rem housing under this plan
would be $61.98 million, or $20.18 million more than is currently
budgeted.
B. Additional Government Funding Sourges
Both Governor Cuomo and Mayor Koch, motivated by the dearth
of federal funds for low-income housing and encouraged by the
fiscal conditions both state-wide and city-wide, have proposed new
funding sources, all of which could be used for the in rem
program. Governor Cuomo has suggested directing the revenues
expected from the repayment of the Battery Park City bonds to low-
income housing. Since this income stream does not begin until
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1991, however, it must be considered a possibility for the
1
future Both the Governor and Mayor Koch would like to see some
revenue coming from the World Trade Center, in the form of either
real estate tax payments if the complex is sold to a private
concern, or payments made-in lieu of tax'es by the Port Authority,
its current owner. The Mayor proposes using these revenues to
float $1 billion in bonds that can be used to support low- and
modera'te-income housing development.
As discussed previously, the Mayor is interested in using
city capital funds to renovate apartments in Central Management
buildings. In his current budget message he has asked for $75
million over five years for the renovation of 9000 apartments, or
$15 million a year. Since the capital budget is used only for
permanent city property, Koch's willingness to use it for in rem
buildings suggests a grudging acknowledgement of the city's long-
term commitment to.maintain this housing. If this $15 million
were budgeted in addition to, and not in place of existing city
commitments it would cover most the $20 million shortfall shown in
Table 4.4. It's possible, however, that the Mayor's proposal
refers to the aforementioned program to renovate vacant apartments
for homeless Human Resource Administration clients. In that case,
$20 million would still be needed to upgrade occupied apartments.
C. Alternative Funding Sggurces: Hosing Irust Funds
In many cities confronted by the cut-back of federal housing
funds efforts have been made to raise revenue for housing from the
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private market. The notion that those profitting from real estate
development in booming downtown markets should be contributing to
the creation of housing units throughout the city underlies plans
already implemented in San Francisco and Boston and under
discussion in New York. These plans all involve levying some form
of surcharge on development to be contributed to a housing trust
fund. The justification for taxing various forms of real estate
activity to aid the development of low-income housing is complex.
There is the argument that commercial development increases the
demand for housing by attracting new workers to the city. By
making contributions to housing creation commensurate with the
size of their commercial projects, developers are helping to keep
housing supply and demand in balance. The legal basis for
instituting such a charge is the extension of the municipality's
zoning powers. That the costs and benefits of downtown
development are not felt equally by all city residents is another
justification for requiring developer contributions. Frequently.,
property taxes paid by middle-income residents of neighborhoods
outside of the downtown area fund the infrastructure improvements
2
needed to facilitate downtown development
In the San Francisco "linkage" plan a developer must
construct one housing unit for every 1125 square feet of office
space he builds. Alternatively, he may contribute from $4000 to
$6C,000 ($3.50 to $5.30 per square foot) to a city fund used to aid
housing suppliers. The San Francisco plan is designed to address
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problems of housing supply, and does little to ensure that the
units constructed with this money are affordable to moderate- or
low-income people. In Boston, commercial development is taxed at
$5.00 a square foot, exempting the first 100.,C000 square feet.
Since the tax is payable over twelve years, assuming a 10%
discount rate, the actual payment comes to only $2.50 a square
foot. This plan could generate $37 to $52 million over ten
3
years
Planners in New York City have entertained proposals for
instituting similar
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ing this fee, $21 million could be
collected for the housing trust fund. Sponsors of cooperative and
condominium conversions pay a similarly token filing fee. An
increase of this filing charge on all converted units selling for
over $75,000 would raise $8 million. These suggestions are
appealing because they increase taxes that are already in place
rather than levying new ones. The existing taxes also affect real
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estate transactions that are extremely lucrative for those
involved but don't directly produce new housing units.
The Pratt-Metropolitan proposal includes a developer
contribution provision. Like the San Francisco and Boston plans
it posits a connection between commercial development and housing
demand, and proposes that developers contribute $6,000 to the
housing trust fund for every 1000 square feet of rentable office
space they construct. Unlike the other plans this one includes a
levy on residential development, excepting projects that are part
of other low- and moderate-income housing production programs.
Residential builders have the option of setting aside 10". of the
units in their development as low rent apartments (defined as
those renting within the HUD Fair Market Rent Maximum, currently
$420 for a two-bedroom apartment), or contributing $6 per rentable
square foot to the housing trust fund. Based on current market
trends, an estimated $50 million could be raised each year from
developer contributions.
These combined sources could raise $200 million for housing
in New York City. If this were added to the $200 million of CD
funds currently used to support low-cost housing efforts., and
leveraged with market-rate funds, it could produce 20,000 to
25,000 new and rehabilitated units each year. If some of this
money were used for moderate rehabilitation of in rem units as
proposed in the previous chapter, it could be stretched even
further.
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Other proposals to raise money focus on taxing the large
profits currently being made in the luxury housing market. Peter
Marcuse, who advocates a luxury housing tax, believes that the
benefits of good housing result from providing public amenities:
"highways, infrastructure, utilities, public services--and tax
breaks. Today those with higher income and better housing obtain
more benefits from these public actions, lower income people, who
4
need such benefits more, benefit less" . A tax on the housing of
those with higher incomes helps to settle the score. Marcuse
proposes taxes on the income from units renting for over $1000 a
month, a progressive property tax, adding 2". to the tax rate of
units worth over $100,000, and a speculation tax on capital gains
from the sale of units for over $100,000. Altogether these taxes
5
could raise $250 million a year
Whether or not a housing trust fund made up of developer
contributions and miscellaneous taxes is an appropriate way to
fund low-income housing, it is not likely to be implemented in New
York in the near future. The less controversial proposals, such
as dedicating revenues from existing taxes to the trust fund, do
not invite much opposition; neither do they increase the city's
ability to provide services, however, since they simply divert
money from one budget line to another. Any proposals that do
generate additional income for the city, such as a developer
contribution or a luxury housing tax, are not supported by the
Koch Administration. The only official city initiative in this
regard was the creation of a mayoral commission to study the use
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of zoning authority to extract concessions--low-income housing or
public amenities--from developers. This Development Commitments
Study Commission concluded that zoning should not be used to
achieve broader social goals. It did recommend the creation of
some sort of housing trust to support low- and moderate-income
housing development, but suggested it be funded with CD and UDA6
money, which of course is already the funding source for the
city's housing programs.
The Commission's reluctance to endorse any additional levy on
developers is indicative of officials' squeamishness regarding any
policy that makes demands on the business community. New York
analysts fear that their apparently robust economy will be
debilitated by any additional tax burden. In fact, until recently
it has been customary to extend tax abatements to developers
almost as-of-right--even to those building in the lucrative mid-
Manhattan area. The last such abatement is scheduled to end in
July of this year after pressure from City Council. But planners
on the City Planning Commission are dismayed to lose these
incentives to developers, and believe that a disincentive such as
a housing trust fund contribution would greatly discourage
investment in New York City real estate.
Why is New York, with its strong Manhattan real estate
market, reluctant to charge developers with some responsibility
for supporting low-income housing? Certainly the attitude of the
Mayor, whose position is reputedly pro-development, has influenced
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city policy. But beyond that looms the memory of the fiscal
crisis, which was evoked by every city official I questioned. All
New Yorkers dread the possibility of returning to those dark days
of job loss and service withdrawal, but the "lessons of the fiscal
crisis" and their influence on city policy are as controversial in
New York as the "lessons of Vietnam" are within the U.S. foreign
policy establishment. The Koch administration has taken the view
that the fiscal crisis was the result of an overextension of
municipal responsibilities and a climate unconducive to private
investment; it therefore shuns programs that involve city dollars,
and works to make the city an attractive place to do business.
Proponents of developer contributions and/or taxes are critical of
Administration policy, contending that the Manhattan real estate
market is so strong that additional taxes can be levied without
discouraging investment.
This debate over development policy ultimately boils down to
a presumably empirical question: What is the elasticity of demand
for office and residential space in Manhattan? If developers can
pass along any additional tax burdens to those who buy or rent
from them, then they will not be discouraged from investing. The
Pratt-Metropolitan housing trust fund proposal analyzed the impact
of a $6 per rentable square foot charge on a residential and a
commercial project. They found that a commercial developer, who
can now anticipate pre-tax internal rate of return of 32-33%,
would still be getting a healthy 30-32% internal rate of return
with the $6 contribution. Rents would increase 1.5-2.5%. For the
residential development, the contribution lowers the pre-tax
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internal rate of return from 18.6% to 16.38%, and forces rents to
6
increase somewhere between 2.5% and 4.2% . In neither case does
the tax appear to have much affect on a project's profitability.
Since it would be levied on all developments, no one project would
be disadvantaged. While these calculations beg the questions of
the precise shape of the demand curve, they do suggest that rent
increases as a result of a new tax would be minimal, and potential
tenants would be unlikely to give up a Manhattan location because
of a rent increase of under 5%.
D. The Cross-Subsidy Program
HPD has begun its own limited version of a housing trust
fund. The cross-subsidy program, about to be enacted in one
section of the Southside, contributes the income generated from
the sale of vacant city-owned property in the area to a fund used
to produce and improve low- and moderate-income housing. The
cross-subsidy idea was actually devised as a compromise between
the low-income Hispanic residents of the Southside's devastated
"Triangle" area and the more affluent Hassidic Jewish community
nearby. The large tracts of vacant land in the Triangle attracted
Hassidic developers, who saw the oppportunity to create market-
rate housing for their growing community. Low-income residents
saw their future in the Triangle threatened by development, and
protested the sale of city-owned lots for this purpose. The
cross-subsidy program, which allows existing residents to benefit
from the increased market value of property in their area,
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succeeded in ending the stalemate between the two groups.
Approximately $2 million will be raised through the sale of
the Triangle's city-owned property, and this revenue will be used
to bring down the costs of the Section 235 units being planned,
and to supplement an existing revolving loan fund that is
available to tenant-managed buildings, including those in the in
7
rem programs . A similar plan is being proposed for the Lower
East Side, which has a parallel juxtaposition of poor residents,
vacant city-owned land, and developers interested in new
opportunities.
While the cross-subsidy allows the benefits of market
activity to accrue to those it may negatively affect, and is a
good way to protect the interests of tenants in a particular
neighborhood, it doesn't represent any absolute addition to the
resources available for in rem housing. Revenues from sale of
city-owned property already go toward supporting operating costs
of Central Management buildings. Contributing the proceeds from
the sale of certain parcels to particular projects only means that
Central Management's operating funds will have to come from
another source.
E. An Eguitable Tax System
While developer contributions, luxury housing taxes and
cross-subsidies are worth discussing as potential sources for
housing funds, New York City should be able to raise the money it
needs for in rem housing from the tax base it has.
tax abatements on lucrative projects that would most surely have
been built without this added incentive have cost the city
millions of dollars. The midtown and Lower Manhattan office
expansions of CBS and Irving Trust, for instance, could have been
built without a tax abatement; so could the high-rise luxury
condominiums sprouting up along the East Side. In FY 1982 an
estimated $582 million was given up by the city in tax
8
abatements . Now that the last of these programs is ending (tax
abatements are now available only for low- and moderate-income
housing and for developments outside Manhattan), the city could
collect more taxes, making additional levies unnecessary. George
Sternlieb has suggested earmarking tax revenue from new, non-
9
abated developments for low-income housing
On a smaller scale, New York City loses money by
underassessing property values in upgrading neighbhorhoods. Peter
Marcuse studied two such neighborhoods--Park Slope in Brooklyn and
the Upper West Side of Manhattan--and found that, while the
average sales price rose 177%, assessed values rose only 26.3%.
Since one-third of the buildings sold on the Upper West Side also
received tax abatements, it is likely that net tax revenues
10
decreased in these improving areas
In sum, with an additional $20 million a year HPD could ensure
that each of its in rem buildings have, at minimum, adequate
mechanical systems. While there are a number of previously
untapped sources for this money, in fact it could easily be found
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In the past,
in the city budget if existing taxes were equitably levied.
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Conclusion
CONCLUSION
This thesis describes a model for housing the poor that
promotes neighborhood stabilization, contributes to the personal
development of its participants, and requires only minimal public
subsidies, red tape and agency involvement. This model, the
basis of New York City's In Rem Housing Program, in unique. It
represents a clear alternative to private, for-profit ownership.
It recognizes the importance of community. And its inspiration
comes from the spontaneous actions of creative, desperate people
who., without official sanction or preconceived ideology, began to
seize control of property that no longer met the investor's need
to make a profit but continued to meet their need to keep a roof
over their heads. Whether these pioneers fifteen years ago were
squatters who moved into empty HUD-owned houses or tenants who
pooled their resources to manage their apartment buildings once
their landlord had walked away, their actions reflected their
conviction that the private sector was not going to provide them
with satisfactory housing and their impatience with meager
government attempts to augment or replace private efforts. These
ad hoc responses have been formalized into government-sponsored
urban homesteading programs, by far the largest of which is New
York's In Rem Housing Program.
What makes the In Rem Housing Program so interesting is its
ad hoc evolution, so different than that of most housing programs
which are carefully designed by planners and debated by
politicians. The IRHP that was created in 1978 merely tied
together
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comparing
advantage
a number of trends--landlord abandonment,
and tenant sweat equity--that had been developing
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neighborhoods, which is hardly appealing right now,
been completely chaotic. But even if we do compare
traditional housing programs it looks good. It's per
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The In Rem Housing Program, both in its present form and in
the Assisted, Tenant Leasing proposal, is open to criticism
because it does not provide housing comparable to that
constructed for more affluent residents. Some older in rem
units, which lack bathroom sinks, may not even meet FHA
standards. But frankly, low-income families could end up
homeless waiting for planners to develop more attractive housing
in at a time when the federal government has all but abandoned
its role in housing subsidization. A program that ensures
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structurally adequate, safe and sanitary living quarters at low
costs is one that can address the housing problems faced by the
poor today. Since control of the property ultimately resides
with the tenants, they are the ones who will be able to benefit
by further improving their buildings should more substantial
funding become available in years to come. Meanwhile, there's no
reason to think that a combination of city-funded systems repairs
and tenant-funded cosmetic repairs, and responsible maintenance
cannot extend the life of these buildings for ten or fifteen
years
A. The Future of In Rem Housing
City-wide trends suggest that the rate of tax foreclosure is
decreasing. Thus, while there will continue to be a net gain of
city-owned housing units, the rate of increase will be slower
than it had been a few years ago. The city can therefore
approach in rem management without the sense of crisis it has
had.
This thesis underscores the importance of tenant control as
a way to ensure adequate housing for the poor. I have not
devoted much attention to the role of private managers or public
management in the future of in rem policy.
The discussion of POMP in Chapter Four indicated the success
of this program, but questioned whether it could preserve low-
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income housing in the long run. For these reasons I would
recommend that POMP be continued, and even expanded, if qualified
managers and appropriate properties can be identified. But
private management should continue to be the exception, and not
the rule for in rem properties. Too many questions about the
long-term availability of low-cost units under private management
remain unanswered. Tenants should continue to have "first right
of refusal" to manage and purchase their buildings. Since in rem
programs do involve government grants to participants, it is only
right that residents of a building should have the option of
receiving those grants to improve their own housing before a
profit-oriented private manager is called in.
Perhaps the most difficult task for in rem policy-makers is
to plan for its Central Management buildings. This task will
become easier if more money is devoted to preventative
maintenance in these buildings. Because HPD has so many
responsibilities,. including the vesting and initial processing of
all the in rem buildings, it might be advantagous to relieve the
agency of responsibility for managing these 32,000 units.
One alternative might be to shift Central Mangement
buildings, after an initial stabilization period, to NYCHA. Such
a plan was unsuccessfully attempted several years ago. It's
failure has been attributed to poor communications between HPD
1
and NYCHA , and to the inability of NYCHA, which it used to
handling pre-screened tenants in newly-constructed apartments,
2
to accomodate itself tothe in rem situation .It is possible
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that the improvement in HPD's intake procedures has made another
attempt at inter-agency cooperation worth pursuing. It is a
shame that New York's in rem tenants should not receive the
benefits of NYCHA's fifty years of experience in low-income
housing management because two agencies are unwilling to
cooperate. Another alternative would be for HPD to create its
own housing authority, which at least would leave the agency free
to vest properties more frequently
Landlord abandonment, like plant closings, is a symptom of
larger market forces over which a municipality has little
control. Yet it is the local government which must contend with
the results of private disinvestment. Cities have been able to
do very little to curb or replace private investment in industry.
By virtue of its tax foreclosure laws, however, the City of New
York has the legal weapon to seize housing from an abandoning
landlord. It thus has the opportunity to create an alternative
to the private housing market. Its In Rem Housing Program can be
a model for other cities in two respects. First, it is a
prototype of municipal involvement in a declining housing market.
While the precise structure of the in rem housing programs might
not be appropriate to other cities, the notion that the city can
play a role in preserving housing in the face of private
disinvestment in one from which others can learn. Second, it
relies on tenant control to achieve much of its success. As
tenant cooperatives are now touted as a means of providing
housing for low-income families, the lessons of the DAMP
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cooperatives--that tenant self-management can work but only with
public support and in conjunction with other government housing
programs--are well worth studying.
Notes on Conclusion
1. Susan Baldwin, "Exit, the New York City Housing Authority,"
City Limits 6 (March, 1981), 16-19.
2. Brian Sullivan, The Division of Alternative Management
PrograMs.
3. Harry DiRienzo and Joan B. Allen, Te New York City In Rem
Housing Engrm
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APPENDIX ONE
Summary of Changes in New York City Rent
Regulation Systems, 1943-present.
System Type of Regulation
Rent Control Rents frozen except
for 15% increase on
vacancy.
Rent Control Same as abovewith
15% across the board
increase in 1953.
Rent Control City takes over system
from state; luxury
decontrol in 1964.
Rent Stabil-
ization
Maximum Base
Rent
Vacancy De-
control
Emergency
Tenant Pro-
tection Act
Rent increases accord-
ing to formula tied
to CPI.
7.5% annual increases
depending on costs.
All apartments decon-
trolled upon vacancy.
Rent stabilization
applied to all apart-
ments which have
reached market rents.
Year
1943
1950
1962
Source: David Bartlett and
Ronald Lawson, "Rent Control: A Second
Look at the Evidence," Journal of Urban
Affairs 4 (Fall, 1982).
1974-1984: Structure of both systems remained unchanged. Each year
allowable increases for rent stabilized apartments are adjusted.,
and vacancy allowances are adjusted. In some years there have
been no vacancy allowances.
In 1984 administration of the rent stabilization system moved from
the Rent Stabilization Association to the New York State. Rent
Control is still administered by New York City.
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Buildings Affected
All rental units in
buildings with 3 or
more units.
All units as above in
buildings built pre-
1947.
As above; vacancy
decontrol for units
in buildings of 3-6
units.
All units in
buildings built
1947-1969 with 6
or more units.
All rent controlled
units.
All units
All previously
regulated and
subsequently
decontrol led
units.
1969
1970
1971
1974
APPENDIX TWO
The Redemption Process
The process by which
delinquent properties is
along the way at which a
terms of redemption are c
ease with which one can
role in determining how
the City of New York takes ti
a slow one, and there are ma
landlord can bring it to a c
omplicated and controversial,
get back one's property plays
one will handle property tax
tle to tax
ny points
lose. The
since the
a large
payments.
On the one hand, a policy of easy redemption would enco
landlords to postpone tax payments and redeem deli
properties at the last minute. On the other hand,
redemption is difficult, property owners who defaulted on
payments due to some kind of emergency but want to keep
buildings cannot get them back. For every story of the rap
landlord eager to retrieve his building in order to mi
further, there is the story of the elderly couple losing
home because hospital bills forced them to miss a few pay
In recognition of the fact that there are at least two kin
property owners who find themselves in tax arrears, and tha
roughly break down into those who own and live in a
urage
nquent
when
their
their
aci ous
lk it
their
ments.
ds of
t they
small
building, and those who own one or more large buildings and live
elsewhere, the city has followed a bifurcated
designed to facilitate redemptions by the
discourage them by the latter.
redemption policy
former group and
Taxes are due the first day of each quarter; there is a
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fifteen day grace period before penalties are levied. The annual
interest charge on overdue bills is 7% for debts under $2750 and
16.5% for other debts. These terms are in effect until the
process of vesting title has begun. Once a building has been
selected for foreclosure its owner must either pay in full or
sign an agreement with additional penalties to redeem his
property. The terms are outlined below.
Because the redemption terms are substantially unchanged
from the Brooklyn In Rem Action 33 of 1982, we will use this
action as a example. In the winter of 1981-82, the Department of
Finance compiled a list of all buildings owing four or more
quarters of property taxes. These buildings were "selected" for
vesting. Owners of these buildings were notified of the pending
action, and given until April 30 to come forward. In order to
stop their building from being included in the next phase of
vesting, called "filing," they had to do the following:
Owner occupants of 1 - 5 family buildings:
--Pay in full;
-- Pay 10% of arrears down and sign agreement to pay off balance,
along with future taxes, over twelve years.
-- If total arrears are under $2750 interest is 7%; if over,
16.5%.
All other owners:
-- Pay in full;
-- Pay 15% down and pay off balance over eight years. Interest
same as for small buildings.
In both cases, agreements could be made after the April 30 filing
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date but before vesting with 25.5% interest.
Once the city vests title it is still possible for a
landlord to get his property back. The four month period after
vesting is the "Mandatory Release Period." During this time a
building is released to it former owner (with approval of the
Corporation Counsel) if payment is made in full. A landlord can
also enter into an installment agreement with the approval of the
Board of Estimate and the Department of General Services, Such
an agreement requires a $100 filing fee, and a deposit of $900
or all taxes owed, whichever is less. If the agreement is
approved, owner occupants of one to five unit buildings receive
the same terms as they had before vesting; others must pay 50%
down and the balance within one year. Once the Mandatory Release
Period is over, there is still a two year Discretionary Period
during which time a landlord can regain his property with Board
of Estimate approval.
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APPENDIX THREE
The Legal Status of DAMP CoogeCatives
Before purchasing their buildings, tenant groups must
incorporate as Housing Development Fund Corporations as described
in Article XI of New York State's Private Financing Law. Only
HDFCs are permitted to purchase buildings directly from the City
of New York without undergoing some kind of open bidding process.
HDFCs are required to provide housing for low-income persons,
defined as those whose annual gross income does not exceed six
times the annual rental, including all utilities. Because HDFCs
are for-profit corporations (a not-for-profit corporation cannot
issue shares, therefore it is not an appropriate form for a
cooperative), they must pay corporate income taxes.
DAMP cooperatives are
which the amount of equity,
accumulate is restricted.
follows:
also limited equity cooperatives
or profit, that an individual
The resale restrictions are
First three years: seller recoups initial
investment (presumably $250) plus any special
assessments. Any additional profit goes to the
cooperative.
After three yeaCs: seller recoups initial
investment, plus special assessments, plus any
capital improvements that had been approved by the
cooperative. Any additional profit is split
between the seller and the cooperative, with the
seller retaining 30'.. The cooperative board can vote to
further restrict the percentage kept by the seller, but
cannot vote to liberalize the seller's share.
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can
as
Cooperatives produced through the TIL program cannot vote to
sell the entire building for ten years; those from the Community
Management Program cannot sell the building for fifteen years.
Residents of DAMP coops in the Chelsea-Clinton area will be
required to pay an additional 40. of their profit to the city.
No mechanism for enforcing this has been devised, however.
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APPENDIX FOUR
Assumgtions Used for Calculating Prgjected Costs
for In Rem Buildings
Fixed Costs - Based on similarly situated buildings
Variable Costs
Plumbing - Assumes each unit will have one to two leaks each
year, each costing $500 to repair.
Electrical - Based on electrical repair costs for these
buildings over the past few years. It's hard to estimate
the cost to a building of faulty wiring, since the risk of
fire is more important than the actual cost of repairs.
Plastering - Includes repairs, usually after water damage.
Therefore plastering costs decrease when plumbing and
electricity are repaired.
Appliances - Refers to stoves and refrigerators. If all new
appliances are purchased., each will cost $350.00 and will
need replacing every ten years. If used appliances are
purchased., they will cost $125.00 to $150.00 each, and will
have to be replaced every two years.
Painting - Each apartment is repainted every three years, as
per New York State law.
Boiler maintenance - based on past experience.
Electrical Service - for building common areas; based on past
experience.
Fuel - based on past experience.
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Description
Projected
Contribution
Real Property Tr
Ifor schedule
see attached
State Stamp Tax
4for schedule
see attachedl
Capital Bains Ta
Mortgage Tax -
ifor schedule
see attachedl
ansfer Tax - A levy charged everyties a deed
changes hands. In FY'83 40,944 deeds
changed hands resulting in collections of
97,88,469. The entire sue stays in NYC,
with 069.6 million going into the City's
General Fund
r1
Ct
0
0t
0
()
Most of these funds are presently earmarked.
However, due to the enormity of the housing need
and its relationship to real estate transaction
that a setaside and/or surcharge totalling 10%
be instituted to contribute to a HTF.
Same as above - Create a State Stamp Tax Surcharge
of $15 plus 1/10 of It for amounts over 635K -
Surcharge would be targeted to HTF.
Its estimated that approx. 100 million will
be generated this year. As above, we propose
that a surcharge and/or setaside equivalent
to 15% be instituted and that that amount be
contributed to a HTF
10 Million
1.5 Million
15 Million
This year we expect that SONYMA will receive
approx. 048.5 million. Of this they will retain
about 9% leaving $43.65 million. Of this, 65%
or 028.7 million - NYC's pro-rated share -
should be invested in the Housing Trust Fund
28.7 Million
Building Dept. fees - A fee charged for building inspections.
Various fees charged based on size, type,
and kind, eq. 635 for elevator inspection
etc. FY'83 net fees $13,950,000.
Using this pot of 0 at present is not feasible
since an increase should go into increased
inspections
Title Comments
- Similar to Real Property Transfer Tax but
earmarked for the State. Small nominal
amount remains in NYC for adainistration.
FY'53 40,944 NYC deeds generated
6,326,743 in State revenues.
x - A charge on the sale of property over
*1 million. 10% charged on the gain dif-
forence between the old and the new selling
price. Approximately 5000 transactions of
this type occurred in FY'83, generating
$14,703,145. This revenue currently goes
to the State General Fund and was recently
abolished from going to the City's. *43.5M
collected statewide.
A tax levied for recording a mortgage onto
the title. 37,697 NYC recordings occurred in
FY'83, producing 079,769,961 in revenues
collected, 058W going to the State's
General Fund. The balance is earmarkeds
1% to the Cityg for obligations over 0.5"m
1/4 of 12 goes to MTAI and for mortgages
of $25K and above, 1/4 of 1% for the
SONYMA Mortgage Insurance Program for
rehabs. Statewide mortgage tax collections
last FY amounted to *159.7W.
Title Description
UDAS repayments Repayments of federal Urban Development
Action Brants in FY'93 yielding *146,956
in principal plus $479,9046 in interest,
total *625,902. Current repayments supply
a revolving loan fund that is administered
by the Economic Capital Corporation and is
used as retension, expansion, machinery or
equipment monies for industrial and com-
mercial companies. I -
PLP repayments - Repayments attributable to NYC's Partici-
pation Loan Program. .*2.7M for FY'93.
Article BA Loan Program repayments - Repayments attributable
to NYC's housing systems repair loan
progriam.
Comments
This year's total of $8.5 million seems
exceedingly low. We estimate significant
increases over the next few years. All
repayments should be targeted to the
Housing Trust Fund.
0hftft 1q& bt
10 Million
Sale
City
of Non-Residential
Owned Property -
Sale of Residential
City Owned Property -
Coop and Condominium
filing fees -
Proceeds from the sales and mortgages of
In-Rem commercial properties. 026M
for FY'93.
Proceeds from the sales and mortgages of
In-Reo residential properties.
*6,531,292 in sales and *689,665 in
mortgages for FY'93.
Fees charged for incorporation of a Coop
or Condominium, payable to the Attorney
Seneral's Office. *3,646,307 collected
for FY'93, includes 6300K in amendment
fees. Schen 1/10 df 1% of
thefer4n-pric.....jxmum fee cannot
exceed $10K. Fees go to State.' -
Corporation filing fee - A fee imposed for the filing of
corporations in NY State. *7.Ett col-
lected statewide FY'63. Payable to
Dept. of State.
In FY'53 a total $33.2 million was received.
We estimate that this level will continue for
the next few years. The total, minus admin-
istrative expenses, should be targeted to
the housing trust fund.
30 Million
These fees should be completely restructured.
Base fee schedule should prevail for all units
selling below $75K, the fee would be increased
by 50% for units offered between *75 - 100K,
and by 100% for units offered above $100K.
The cap of $10,000 per building should be
removed.
Fee structure should be revamped and increased
with excess income estimate at *2 million
going to housing trust fund.
8 Million
2 Million
Title Description
Registration for Limited
Partnership Byndications - A fee charged for the registration
of real estate syndications. Statewide'
FY'83 collections amounted to $3,650,174,
almost exclusively from NYC. Fees go to
State. 1/10 of 12 of dollar offering.
Minimum fee $250. Maxism cannot exceed
$10,000.
Interest Earned on Real
Estate Escrow Accounts - Interest earned on state aided or assisted
real estate endeavor.
Hotel Occupancy Surcharge - A sliding scale surcharge averaging -.
$.50 per room per night occupancy tax
imposed on every hotel room in the City -
Tax Increment Finance
Big Mac Pay Back -
District - A surcharge levied to those benefited
by a particular service or local improvement
in an area. Financing usually applied to re-
development by a bond issue that will be ser-
viced from the anticipated additional tax re-
venues following the redevelopment.
Defined from attached.--
Comments
Real estate related limited partnerships are
a lucrative area that have not been tapped to
benefit NYC. We propose an intensive investi-
gation of how this can be done. However, we
propose that the fee structure be revamped
to yield a total of $9 - 10 million with the
excess over $4 million going to the HTF.
This is being investigated by a Veatch
Foundation Study. We estimate that $10
million per year can be generated.
There are over 06,000 hotel rooms in the City
averaging over 70% occupancy over the 365
days of the year. In most instances *.50 per
night would amount to less than a 3/4 of 12
surcharge to the cost of overnight lodging.
we estimate that about *10 - 15 million
per year can be generated by the increased
real estate values attributed to public
aetions. These would be harnessed under our
proposal by establishing a T.I.F.D. The
income of which would yield about $12.5
million per year to the H.T.F.
Interest earned on reserve accounts,
paybacks, and unspent * from the proposal.
Big Mac Housing Investment Fund would
yield approx. *20 million per year.
Inclusionary Zoning Payment
Commercial Development Exactions - $ 0 Million
T ot al $229.7 Million
H
u-I
Hj
21 Million
10 Million
It Million
12.5 Million
20 Million
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